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During the past two decades, the rate of unionization among profes-
sional employees has substantially increased while the overall proportion
of workers in unions has dramatically declined. Some professional em-
ployees-such as performing artists, journalists, engineers, and
nurses-have relatively long traditions of unionization. Other professional
employees-such as teachers, college professors, lawyers, and doc-
tors-have joined unions more recently. Despite enormous differences in
the proportion of union membership in various professions, some analysts
view professional employees as a primary hope for the future of the
American labor movement.'
1. See, e.g., R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 244-45 (1984). For data on
the extent of unionization among professional employees, see S. BRINT & M. DODD, PROFESSIONAL
WORKERS AND UNIONIZATION: A DATA HANDBOOK (1984) (published by Department of Profes-
sional Employees, AFL-CIO); Aronson, Unionism Among Professional Employees in the Private Sec-
tor, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 352 (1985).
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Unions representing professional employees increasingly stress that they
seek legal protection for traditional professional values. These values in-
clude participation in developing organizational policy, significant respon-
sibility for personnel decisions about fellow professionals, the establish-
ment of professional standards, and the commitment of organizational
resources to professional goals. Doctors and nurses attempt to influence
the nature of health care in hospitals, musicians want to serve on the
audition committees of symphony orchestras, professors seek guarantees of
academic freedom in universities, and legal aid attorneys negotiate for ad-
equate space to counsel their clients in privacy.2 Yet many professional
employees, including many who have joined unions, share the concern of
employers, managers, and members of the general public that collective
bargaining may be incompatible with these values. The danger that
unionization governed by principles of American labor law will impair
collegial participation in organizational decision-making may be the most
frequently expressed concern.3
Anxieties about tensions between labor law doctrines and professional
values are well founded. American labor law developed in response to
industrial sector collective bargaining and reflects basic assumptions that
deviate from professional values. The National Labor Relations Act
Although scholars generally agree that "profession" is a meaningful category, the difficulty in dis-
tinguishing professions from other occupations has prompted debate over the professional status of
various employees. In another article, I discuss this scholarly literature and construe professions
broadly to provide a range of illustrations. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers From Cov-
ered Professionals Under the NLRA, 89 COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming Dec. 1989) (manuscript at 1,
n.1; on file with author). Because my illustrations almost always include references to well-established
professions, a reader's disagreement with particular attributions of professional status should not be a
major barrier to evaluating the general points they illustrate. See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying
text (citing definitions of professional in scholarly literature and in NLRA).
2. See infra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing collective bargaining as means to profes-
sional values). See generally Rabban, The Treatment of Professional Issues in Collective Bargaining
Agreements (1989) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (examining extent of correlation
between labor contracts and professional values in broad range of professions and organizations).
3. When the governing Council of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP)
voted to "pursue collective bargaining as a major additional way of realizing the Association's goals in
higher education," three dissenters wrote a statement asserting the "manifest unwisdom" of this ac-
tion. Council Position on Collective Bargaining, 58 A.A.U.P. BuLlu 46, 57 (1972). The dissent's
forceful peroration illustrates concerns by professional employees about the potential costs of collective
bargaining:
[W]hen the industrial model begins seriously to thrust out the academic model, when tradi-
tional organs of faculty government begin to disappear, when freedoms are eroded, when prin-
ciples become bargaining counters, even one-time enthusiasts for collective bargaining may find
it helpful to have someone to turn to to support them in an effort to save the only values that
make the material sacrifices of an academic profession worthwhile.
Id. at 61.
Professor Mintzberg argues that unionization inevitably destroys professional values and encour-
ages professional organizations to behave more like hierarchical industrial ones, thereby accelerating
rather than arresting the pathologies the professional employees sought to combat by organizing. Un-
ions, he claims, can damage collegiality, professional autonomy, and individual responsibility.
Mintzberg, A Note on the Unionization of Professionals from the Perspective of Organization The-
oly, 5 INDUS. RE. L.J. 623, 630-34 (1983); see also Rabban, The Emerging Professional Model of
Collective Bargaining (1989) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (presenting different views
about compatibility of collective bargaining with traditional professional values).
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(NLRA)4 is the basic federal law governing collective bargaining. Al-
though the Act applies only to employees in the private sector,5 subse-
quent state and federal legislation covering public employees' incorporates
many doctrines from the NLRA model. The application of several key
doctrines to professional employees in both the private and public sectors
creates significant impediments to the realization of professional goals in
collective bargaining.
Assumptions derived from the industrial sector limit the eligibility of
professional employees to bargain under the NLRA.' Yet the coverage of
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982) (excluding United States and "any State or political subdivision
thereof" from definition of "employer" and thus from NLRA coverage).
6. State legislatures began enacting statutes in the late 1950's and 1960's enabling collective bar-
gaining by state, county, and municipal employees. Over thirty states have passed such legislation, and
additional states have extended statutory bargaining rights to limited categories of public employees.
See Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1676-79 (1984) [here-
inafter Developments]. Federal employees obtained some collective bargaining rights through an Exec-
utive Order signed in 1962, Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-1963), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 631 (1964), revoked by Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 191 (1969), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 7101 (1982), and are now covered by the more comprehensive collective bargaining provisions of the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1982 & Supp. 1 1987).
7. See generally Rabban, supra note 1. The exclusion of managers and supervisors from the
coverage of the NLRA reflects the hierarchical and adversarial relationships attributed to the indus-
trial sector. Allowing managerial employees to bargain, legislators feared, would create intolerable
conflicts of interest between their job responsibilities and their solidarity with other unionized employ-
ees. An important Supreme Court decision, NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980), held
that faculty members are managers as a result of their crucial role in formulating educational policy.
The majority emphasized that professional employees, although explicitly covered by the NLRA, may
be ineligible to bargain under its provisions if they also have supervisory or managerial responsibili-
ties. Subsequent decisions by the NLRB have applied Yeshiva to cases where faculty obtained such
influence only after negotiating a collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., College of Osteopathic
Medicine and Surgery, 265 N.L.R.B. 295 (1982). The Yeshiva holding, which has been extended to
physicians and dentists employed by a health maintenance organization, see FHP, Inc., 274 N.L.R.B.
1141 (1985), could jeopardize the coverage under federal labor law of any professional employees who
achieve meaningful participation in organizational decision-making.
In Rabban, supra, I propose that the scholarly distinction between bureaucratic and professional
responsibilities, developed independently by sociologists of the professions and organizational theorists,
should become the legal distinction between professionals excluded as managers or supervisors and
professionals eligible to bargain under the NLRA. This proposed distinction would define fewer pro-
fessionals as managers than the holding in Yeshiva. Yet even a broad application of that holding is
unlikely to remove all, or even most, professional employees from the coverage of the NLRA. As the
majority in Yeshiva emphasized, its holding should not be interpreted to "sweep all professionals
outside the Act in derogation of Congress' expressed intent to protect them." 444 U.S. at 690. Often in
response to challenges based on Yeshiva, the NLRB and the circuit courts have reaffirmed their prior
holdings that various professional employees are covered by the NLRA. See, e.g., Noranda Alumi-
num, Inc. v. NLRB, 751 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1984) (occupational health nurses); Passaic Daily News
v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (newspaper bureau chief); Meredith Corp. v. NLRB, 679
F.2d 1332, 1342 (10th Cir. 1982) (news director of TV station); NLRB v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 644
F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1981) (actor); Walla Walla Union-Bulletin, Inc. v. NLRB, 631 F.2d 609, 614 (9th
Cir. 1980) (sports editor); Greenbrier Valley Hosp., 265 N.L.R.B. 1056 (1982) (head nurse).
Many of the state statutes that govern public sector collective bargaining specifically include profes-
sional employees. E.g., CAL. GOVT. CODE § 3507.3 (West 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 1603(m)
(Smith-Hurd 1986); OHso REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(l) (Anderson 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
111.70 (1) (West 1988). Some of these statutes refer explicitly to faculty. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT.
Chap. 48, § 1702(k) (Smith-Hurd 1986); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(F)(3) (Anderson 1988)
(department heads excluded as supervisors, but no other faculty members defined as supervisors solely
because they "participate in decisions with respect to courses, curriculum, personnel, or other matters
of academic policy"); id. at § 4417.01(K) (faculty members not managers based on "involvement in
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most professional employees under American labor law directs attention to
legal doctrines that may affect the impact of collective bargaining on pro-
fessional employment. This Article focuses on the scope of bargaining, ex-
clusive representation, and company domination, doctrines developed
under the NLRA and incorporated into legislation covering public em-
ployees. The Article suggests related modifications of these doctrines in an
attempt to promote a system of labor law in both the private and public
sectors that is more conducive to professional values.
The distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargain-
ing translates into law the traditionally limited role of workers in the de-
velopment of organizational policy. It limits mandatory negotiations
largely to the "bread and butter" issues that have dominated collective
bargaining in the industrial sector. This distinction allows an employer to
refuse even to discuss significant policy issues that are enormously impor-
tant to many professional employees and frequently prompt them to or-
ganize unions. An employer can take unilateral action with respect to any
matter that is not a mandatory subject.
The legal principles of exclusive representation and company domina-
tion are similarly rooted in the experience of industrial unions. They de-
rive from the reaction against employer repression of independent labor
unions during the years immediately preceding the passage of the NLRA
in 1935. Designed as complementary and reinforcing principles, exclusive
representation and company domination are intended to strengthen union
power against employer attempts to "divide and conquer" employees.
They require employers to bargain about mandatory subjects only with
the exclusive union representative. They also prohibit employers from
dealings regarding these subjects with either individual employees or non-
union employee committees. By limiting contacts between employers and
employees outside the union rubric, these principles threaten collegial de-
cision-making by professional employees.
This Article proposes two major innovations designed to eliminate the
unhealthy influence of legal doctrines designed for industrial workers on
collective bargaining by professional employees. I suggest, at least in the
context of professional employment in both the private and public sectors,
the abolition of the distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects
of bargaining and the simultaneous loosening of the principles of exclusive
representation and company domination. My proposal would require the
employer and the exclusive union representative to bargain (but not to
the formulation or implementation of academic or institution policy"). In excluding managerial em-
ployees from its coverage, the California Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act makes
clear that department chairs as well as other faculty are not managers. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3562(1)
(West 1980).
State labor boards in Alaska and Kansas have rejected attempts to exclude faculty as managers
based on the reasoning of Yeshiva. See Franke, Two Trends in Academic Collective Bargaining: A
Faculty Representative's Perspective, 13 J.L. & EDUC. 651, 657 (1984).
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agree) about any subject either raises and to sign a written contract incor-
porating any agreement reached. This contract would apply to all employ-
ees in the unit, whether or not they are members of the union. At the
same time, my proposal would allow the employer, while negotiating or
administering a collective bargaining agreement with the union, greater
latitude in discussing any subject with individual employees or committees
of employees. Unions would gain a greater scope of bargaining for the
price of a weakened, but still meaningful, exclusivity and independence.
My proposal reflects a quandary. Current law allows virtually all in-
formal and formal interactions between employers and employees on mat-
ters outside the scope of mandatory bargaining. Yet the principles of ex-
clusive representation and company domination severely limit discussions
about mandatory subjects of bargaining with any person or group other
than the union. Expanding the scope of bargaining without also loosening
the principles of exclusive representation and company domination would
require employers to negotiate with unions over policy issues of profes-
sional concern that are now permissive, but would limit or eliminate inde-
pendent contacts between employers and employees about those issues un-
less the union itself allows them.
Many people concerned about maintaining professional values after
unionization thus favor the current narrow range of mandatory subjects.'
Under such a system, they correctly observe, union representation cannot
preempt most of the valuable discussions about professional issues that
take place in committees or through personal contacts between administra-
tors and professional employees. This approach, as its advocates occasion-
ally concede, contains numerous practical difficulties, including the intrac-
table problems inherent in distinguishing mandatory from permissive
subjects.' More fundamentally, the distinction weakens the role of a union
in dealing with employers about the very professional issues that may
have led to its selection. Many professional employees vote for union rep-
resentation because they perceive alternative mechanisms for exercising
professional influence, to the extent that they exist at all, as ineffective or
insufficiently comprehensive."0 And even if bodies of professional employ-
8. See infra notes 106, 146-47.
9. See infra notes 64-71, 74 (cases reaching conflicting holdings on whether subject is mandatory
or permissive); Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156,
1195 (1974); Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Public Higher Education, Faculty Collective
Bargaining in Public Higher Education-Three Key Issues, in FACULTY BARGAINING IN PUBLIC
HIGHER EDUCATION 13-15 (1977) [hereinafter Carnegie Council, Three Key Issues].
10. See Rabban, supra note 3. The descriptions of the operation of faculty senates and other
faculty committees in NLRB decisions dealing with the coverage of professors under the NLRA fre-
quently support these perceptions. Several cases have found that the administration rather than the
faculty had effective control over university decision-making even when the faculty had significant
nominal responsibilities. Administrators did not refer key issues to the faculty, acted unilaterally on
matters concurrently under faculty consideration, and overruled faculty recommendations. See, e.g.,
Loretto Heights College v. NLRB, 742 F.2d 1245, 1253-55 (10th Cir. 1984); Cooper Union, 273
N.L.R.B. 1768, 1770-73, 1775-76 (1985), enforced, 783 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
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ees are relatively successful, they operate only at the sufferance of the
employer unless their existence is guaranteed by enforceable collective
bargaining agreements."
Advocates of traditional collective bargaining might object to my propo-
sal from the opposite perspective. Loosening the principles of exclusive
representation and company domination, they might argue, may unneces-
sarily weaken unions through the false assumption that unions cannot ad-
dress professional values as effectively as professional bodies beyond union
control. Democratically elected unions, they might add, must reflect the
views of their members. If the employees in a union are truly committed
to professional values, the union itself will find ways to achieve them
through collective bargaining provisions or through union committees. A
union-controlled faculty senate, forum of lawyers, or council of nurses is
as likely to support professional values as similar bodies selected by the
entire professional work force, particularly if the bargaining unit consists
solely of professional employees eligible to serve on these committees. And
traditional unionists might cite the company domination of employee com-
mittees prior to the NLRA as a warning that allowing such committees
outside the union rubric invites employers to undermine the strength of
the exclusive union representative.
Union officers, who claim that their simultaneous service on indepen-
dent faculty committees has not created conflicts of interest, may lend sup-
port to the position that these committees would function equally well
under union control, an arrangement that has not generated significant
studies or reports. Yet even these union officers concede that many partici-
pants and observers view the union and faculty committees as having sig-
U.S. 815 (1986); Lewis Univ., 265 N.L.R.B. 1239, 1246 n.19, 1249-50 (1982), enforcement denied,
765 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1985); Fundacion Educativa Ana G. Mendez, 265 N.L.R.B. 72, 75 (1982);
Florida Memorial College, 263 N.L.R.B. 1248, 1249-50, 1252-53 (1982), enforced, 820 F.2d 1182,
1184-85 (11th Cir. 1987). One NLRB decision characterized faculty participation as simply "a sophis-
ticated version of the familiar suggestion box." Florida Memorial College, 263 N.L.R.B. at 1254. And
one judge observed that when considering curriculum changes the administration exercised influence
and acted against faculty desires in proportion to the significance of an issue. Lewis Univ., 765 F.2d at
630 (Swygert, J., dissenting). Even a case identifying faculty as managers found that the faculty
council "'chiefly talks.'" Trustees of Boston Univ., 281 N.L.R.B. 798, 811 (1986) (quoting Adminis-
trative Law Judge opinion, quoting Professor William Vance), affd, 835 F.2d 399 (1st Cir. 1987).
11. One proposal for collective bargaining in higher education would limit the scope of bargaining
to monetary issues but would allow a union to "bargain about the establishment of an academic senate
of faculty members to provide oversight of academic matters, or about general policies and proce-
dures." Carnegie Council, Three Key Issues, supra note 9, at 14; see infra notes 106, 108 (discussing
position of Carnegie Council).
Dolores Sloviter, a Federal circuit judge and former law professor, has warned faculty members
against placing legal reliance on "some vague understanding which the university inevitably denies."
Even the formal policies of universities, she points out, "are replete with gaps," and "courts cannot
superimpose a contractual requirement upon parties who have not deigned to bargain for it." She
attributes lack of faculty interest in contractual rights to their self-image "as professionals who have,
at least until recently, disdained the hard-nosed collective bargaining common on behalf of blue-collar
workers." Sloviter, Faculty in Federal Court: Decreasing Receptivity?, 68 ACADEME 19, 22-23
(1982).
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nificantly different "personalities." ' Many perceive collective bargaining
as inevitably adversarial and political, qualities that preclude the collegial
and deliberative roles essential for committees to function effectively as
conduits of professional expertise and judgment. Under this view, commit-
tees "captured" by unions are, by definition, unable to act independently
and professionally.1" Union officers may be able to preserve their profes-
sional roles on independent committees, but not on committees controlled
by the union. Even if this common view lacks a sufficient empirical foun-
dation, its prevalence among professional employees, as well among their
employers and the general public, suggests that labor law should allow the
preservation of committees free from union control.
If, moreover, one accepts the general proposition that professional em-
ployees should bring their expertise and judgment to bear on organiza-
tional policy, the employer should have the option of establishing commit-
tees and individual contacts with professional employees despite union
objections. The value of professional expertise does not depend on union
membership. Professional employees who have potentially great contribu-
tions to make to the organizations for which they work may refuse to join
unions for personal or ideological reasons. However unfounded their ob-
jections to unionization may be, they should not be precluded from effec-
tive expression of their professional views, and their employers should not
be deprived of the benefit of those views. Membership of faculty on uni-
versity senates and tenure committees, of physicians on committees that
review medical practices in health maintenance organizations, and of law-
yers in forums dealing with staffing patterns and budgets in legal services
programs should be based on professional qualifications rather than union
loyalty.
My proposed doctrinal innovations are not so dramatic as they may
seem. Restricting obligatory bargaining and protected strikes to subjects
defined as mandatory by the NLRB and the courts is a construct of
NLRB and judicial decisions, not a creation of congressional legislation.
Eminent commentators opposed the development of this distinction from
its inception, advocating instead that the parties should bargain about any
subject either raises. 4 The restrictions on contacts between employees and
employers outside the union rubric, in contrast, are emphatically stated in
the legislative history of the NLRA and firmly reiterated in subsequent
12. Glenn, The Faculty Senate and the AAUP at Southern Connecticut State University, 73
ACADEME 16, 17-18 (1987). See generally McDonald, Governance on Trial, 73 ACADEME 20
(1987); Schaefer, The Senate and the Union in the California State University System, 73 ACADEME
12, 15 (1987); Yellowitz, Academic Governance and Collective Bargaining in the City University of
New York, 73 ACADEME 8 (1987).
13. See, e.g., Kadish, The Theory of the Profession and Its Predicament, 58 A.A.U.P. BULL 120
(1972); Mintzburg, supra note 3, at 631-33. See generally Rabban, supra note 3.
14. See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court decisions.15 Yet recent innovative NLRB and circuit court
decisions, often involving professional employees, have rejected union
claims that the establishment of various employee committees constitutes
company domination.1 6 These decisions, though unconvincing doctrinally,
indicate an increasing recognition of the limitations of traditional analysis.
Neither the NLRB nor the courts have attempted similar innovations in
interpreting exclusive representation, but the legislative history of the
NLRA reveals that key figures favored a construction of this principle
quite similar to the one proposed in this Article. 7 In the public sector,
moreover, the First Amendment and state statutes requiring open meet-
ings have limited exclusive representation in ways that approach the doc-
trine I propose applying to professional employees in private as well as
public employment.' 8
The sources of these legal rules suggest different methods of modifying
them. Either judicial or legislative action could legitimately alter current
rules governing the scope of bargaining because the NLRB and the courts
created these rules in the first place. Similar reasoning applies to many
laws covering public employees, although some state statutes identify spe-
cific nonmandatory subjects 9 and therefore must be amended to adopt my
proposal. The changes this Article recommends in the doctrines of exclu-
sive representation and company domination, in contrast, are inconsistent
with the clear meaning of the NLRA and much analogous legislation gov-
erning the public sector. Even innovative theories allowing courts an ex-
panded role in renovating statutes would not justify judicial implementa-
tion of the modifications I recommend.2" New legislation would be
necessary.
15. See infra Sections II and III.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 274-302.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 214-20.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 204-210.
19. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965(1)(c) (1988) (excluding "educational policies"
from scope of bargaining); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.08 (Anderson Supp. 1988) (excluding
standards of services, mission of employer, personnel decisions, and various other subjects from scope
of bargaining). After the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the state labor board's relatively broad
identification of the scope of bargaining in public education, Clark County School Dist. v. Local Gov't
Employee-Management Relations Bd., 90 Nev. 442, 530 P.2d 114 (1974), the Nevada legislature
amended its statute to limit mandatory bargaining to specified matters and to remove from the scope
of bargaining subjects such as "[aippropriate staffing levels and work performance standards," the
"quality and quantity" of public services, and "[t]he means and methods of offering these services."
NEv. REV. STAT. § 288.150 (1986).
20. Dean Calabresi offers perhaps the most comprehensive, subtle, and persuasive of these inno-
vative theories. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). Legislative
inertia, a bad "fit" between the statute and the general "legal landscape," and changes in the "legal
topography" induced by subsequent legislation, constitutional developments, and substantial scholarly
criticism are among Calabresi's creative justifications for judicial power to renovate legislation. Id. at
120-31. While acknowledging that in dramatic circumstances one of these factors may itself justify
judicial intervention, Calabresi observes that "[i]t usually takes a series of constitutional decisions,
ideological changes, technological innovations, or intellectual revolutions to make an old rule anachro-
nistic." Id. at 131.
In my opinion, none of Calabresi's justifications for judicial renovation of statutes applies to the
1990]
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Changes in the law, of course, cannot force either unions or employers
to agree to provisions that support professional values. For example,
broadening the scope of mandatory bargaining does not require unions to
seek such provisions or employers to accept them. Yet these modifications
can influence, even if they cannot determine, the results of collective bar-
gaining. Most professional employees in unions apparently respect and
seek to obtain legal guarantees for professional values.21 Based on the rec-
ord of collective bargaining by professional employees thus far, it is un-
likely that many unions, relying on my proposed expansion of mandatory
subjects, would demand the replacement of traditional collegial mecha-
nisms with inflexible rules that are insensitive to professional concerns.
2 2 I
think it more likely that many employers, relying on the existing legal
construct of permissive subjects, will refuse to include professionals in de-
termining issues of policy.28 And my suggested loosening of the existing
principles of exclusive representation and company domination would al-
low the employer, even over union objections, to deal with professional
employees either individually or through advisory bodies. These related
changes would foster collective bargaining by professionals that is more
compatible with their values, traditions, and aspirations than the process
encouraged by current interpretation of the NLRA and derivative legisla-
tion covering public employees.
Even those who accept the plausibility of my proposal might raise legit-
NLRA provisions on exclusive representation and company domination. In passing the Taft-Hartley
Amendments to the original Wagner Act, Congress reconsidered and reaffirmed these legal doctrines,
even while explicitly addressing the professional employment context in new provisions defining the
appropriate bargaining unit. See infra text accompanying notes 29, 31 & 120 (bargaining unit of
professional employees), 170-75 (exclusive representation) & 240-45 (company domination). Subse-
quent legislation extending the NLRA to employees of nonprofit hospitals, including professional
employees such as doctors and nurses, assumed the continuation of these doctrines. See Pub. L. No.
93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1982) (health care amend-
ments)). In addition, a major effort at labor law reform, which did not address these doctrines, failed
in 1978. H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 23,712-14 (1977), and S. 2467, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (failed labor reform legislation that passed House but not Senate).
More generally, I do not believe that any independent legislative or constitutional developments
have changed the legal "landscape" or "topography" in ways that challenge the continued viability of
exclusive representation or company domination. There have been scholarly and legal debates about
the application of the principle of company domination to various employee committees. See sources
cited infra note 274. These debates, however, reveal sharp disagreements, not the "sufficient accretion
of scholarly criticism" that for Calabresi might undermine the intellectual foundations of statutory
provisions and, together with other factors, justify judicial intervention. G. CALABRESI, supra, at 131.
The growth of collective bargaining by professional employees and the tension between professional
goals and legal doctrines do suggest renovation of statutory provisions dealing with exclusive represen-
tation and company domination. But without justifications for judicial intervention, statutory amend-
ments such as those I offer later in this article are necessary. See infra notes 118, 213, 305 (proposed
amendments).
21. See CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, GOVERNANCE OF HIGHER EDUCA-
TION: SIX PRIORITY PROBLEMS 39-51 (1973); infra note 110 and accompanying text.
22. See Rabban, supra note 2 (revealing protection of professional values in collective bargaining
agreements); infra text accompanying notes 111-17 (providing examples).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 59-85 (cases revealing largely successful employer efforts
to limit professional participation in policy-making by defining topics as permissive). See generally
Rabban, supra note 2.
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imate questions about the range of employees these modified doctrines
should cover. Some might suggest that they should be extended to the en-
tire workforce. Indeed, several recent studies, particularly a highly publi-
cized series of Department of Labor reports, worry that the current inter-
pretations of the legal doctrines I address jeopardize recent and highly
praised attempts to encourage worker participation in the industrial sec-
tor."' Others, by contrast, might cite the vast differences among various
employees described as professionals to maintain that my proposal should
apply only to limited categories of professional employees. The role of
professors in determining the educational policies of universities, they
might assert, is appropriately greater than the roles of scientists in deter-
mining the research policies of their corporate employers or of nurses in
determining the health care policies of hospitals.
Nonetheless, the application of my proposed doctrinal changes to pro-
fessional employees is a more convincing and pragmatic position than ei-
ther of these extreme alternatives. At least in recent American labor his-
tory, industrial unions, often reflecting the views of their members, have
not sought the kind of influence in organizational decision-making that is
so vital to most employees in all professions.25 Contemporary innovations,
frequently grouped under the label "quality of work life" (QWL), deal
primarily with greater employee flexibility and involvement in matters re-
lated to their immediate working conditions. Although met with suspicion
by many within the union movement, they do not represent a major trans-
formation of the traditional role of workers.26 QWL programs may re-
24. The first report was BUREAU OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
PUB. No. 104, U.S. LABOR LAW AND THE FUTURE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION (June
1986). See also sources cited infra note 34.
25. See D. BRODY, WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 173-214 (1980); H. HARRIS, THE
RIGHT TO MANAGE 70-74 (1982); R. ZIEGER, AMERICAN WORKERS, AMERICAN UNIONS, 1920-
1985 at 156-57 (1986).
T. KOCHAN, H. KATZ & R. McKERSIE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RE-
LATIONS 179 (1986), succinctly captures the traditional union position:
[O]ne of the basic principles of the New Deal collective bargaining model was that "manage-
ment manages and workers and their unions grieve or negotiate the impacts of management
decisions through collective bargaining." The reluctance of labor leaders to engage manage-
ment in joint consultations or to seek shared decision-making power reflects the longstanding
business unionism traditions of the labor movement, the practical fear of being coopted into
supporting unpleasant choices, and the political risks associated with getting too closely identi-
fied with management and losing touch with rank-and-file interests.
Id.
Derek Bok and John Dunlop express the conventional wisdom in concluding that "the American
worker has given very little evidence that he cares at all about participating in the running of the
business that gives him his livelihood." D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMU-
NITY 345 (1970). According to more recent survey data, "workers express a relatively low level of
interest in gaining a say over broad areas of managerial decision-making such as investment, plant
location, and managerial salaries." T. KOCHAN, H. KATZ, & R. McKERsIE, supra, at 211-13. Yet
these authors also point out that workers "may upgrade the priorities attached to expectations for
participation if they gain favorable experience with it." Id. at 207.
26. T. KOCHAN, H. KATz & R. MCKERSIE, supra note 25, at 146-205, provides a good over-
view of Quality of Work Life (QWL) programs. The authors conclude that most of these programs
are relatively modest in scope and do not extend to "the strategic level of decision-making." Id. at
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quire some changes in traditional doctrines, 7 but not to the extent that I
propose in the professional employment context.
Both scholars and the general public, moreover, recognize a distinctive
category of professional employment even while disagreeing about its pre-
cise contours. The relative strengths and weaknesses of professional em-
ployees depend on factors such as differences in expertise among profes-
sions, the purposes of the employing organization, the demand for
professional services, and the historical development of particular profes-
sions. Yet the common characteristic of expertise based on intellectual
training overshadows variations among professions and traditionally has
led employers and the general public to accept greater autonomy from
175-77, 203-05. The authors' examples of atypically broad employee involvement, which "include
major changes in work rules and work organization," id. at 176, are still quite limited compared to
the goals and expectations of professional employees. At the end of a case study intended to illustrate
worker participation in "strategic business decisions," the authors appropriately contrast the actual
role of employees in making "suggestions regarding the layout or use of new machinery" after receiv-
ing "advance warning from the plant's industrial engineers regarding upcoming changes in technolo-
gies" with the unrealized possibility that workers might "have a direct say in the actual design of that
technology or in other critical financial or production issues." Id. at 199.
The first interim report by the Department of Labor underlines the limited scope of what it calls
"participative management or quality of work life" programs. BUREAU OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PUB. No. 113, U.S. LABOR LAW AND THE FUTURE OF LABOR-
MANAGEMENT COOPERATION, at 3 (Feb. 1987). In proclaiming the success of these programs, the
report cites "fewer job classifications," the ability of "any assembly worker" to "stop the line because
of a perceived quality or safety problem," and the "heavy reliance on team efforts." Id. at 5. These
innovations do not approach employee participation in major issues of corporate policy.
Union leaders, while indicating their receptivity to QWL programs, worry that employers may use
them to gain concessions from unions without giving workers genuine influence, job security, or other
benefits. See, e.g., Bieber Urges Caution in Responding to Workers Participation Schemes, 3 LAB.
REL. WEEK 187 (Feb. 22, 1989) (UAW President warns QWL programs may be "trap" for work-
ers); 'Worklife' Plans Given Mixed Reviews, AFL-CIO News, Jan. 28, 1984, at 6, col. 2 (President
of AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department warns QWL programs may be "anti-union tool"). Con-
cern that even wary union leaders are cooperating too readily in participatory programs has provoked
challenges from union dissidents. See, e.g., The Payofffrom Teamwork, Bus. WK., July 10, 1989, at
56, 58, 61; U.A.W.'s Challenge from Within, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1989, § 3, at 5, col. 1.
A recent example of a more significant form of employee participation is described in Boeing,
Unions Use Cooperative Approach for Designing New Sheet Metal Facility, 3 LAB. REL. WEEK 206
(March 1, 1989). According to this article, Boeing and two unions are cooperating through joint
labor-management committees in planning and designing a new sheet metal facility. Boeing's corpo-
rate manager for labor relations cited the increasing skill and career orientation of its employees as a
reason for this "risky" experiment in labor-management cooperation. Id. Proliferation of such pro-
grams might challenge existing doctrines of labor law in ways that collective bargaining by profes-
sional employees already do.
27. Various forms of communication about topics that could be construed as "conditions of em-
ployment" between employers and committees of employees in non-union settings may violate the
prohibition against company domination. The same arrangements in union settings may violate exclu-
sive representation as well as company domination. See T. KOCHAN, H. KATZ & R. McKER sIE,
supra note 25, at 234-35. Compare Kohler, Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Signifi-
cance of Section 8(aX2), 27 B.C.L. REv. 499, 542, 547 (employee committees violate § 8(a)(2) of
NLRA if implemented unilaterally by employer but may be permissible if union participates in their
creation and development) with Sockell, The Legacy of Employee-Participation Plans in Unionized
Firms, 37 INDUS. & LAB. Rl. REV. 541, 554 (1984) (suggesting that any employee committee deal-
ing with subjects of collective bargaining violates NLRA). For discussion of Kohler and Sockell arti-
cles, see infra note 303.
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supervision and more participation in organizational decision-making for
professional employees than for other workers. 8
Limiting my proposed doctrinal changes to professional employment
would allow a test of their wisdom in the most plausible and promising
context. The NLRA and derivative legislation governing public employ-
ment already identify professional employees as a distinctive category and
allow them to bargain in separate units.2 Despite the inevitable ambigui-
ties at the borders of most categories, the distinction between professionals
and "rank-and-file" workers has not proved difficult to apply.30 Signifi-
cantly, Congress justified the special treatment of professionals in the
NLRA by recognizing that they seek professional as well as economic
goals through unionization. 31 The additional modifications I suggest for
professionals in both the private and public sectors comport with this rec-
ognition and avoid the cumbersome and unnecessary burden of developing
and applying special rules for each profession.
If these new laws for professional employees are successfully imple-
mented, their general extension might then be considered. Perhaps all
work can approximate the ideals of professional work. As Alvin Gouldner
optimistically wrote, the concern of the "new class" of professional em-
ployees "to control its work environment . . . embodies any future hope
of working class self-management and pre-figures the release from alien-
ated labor."'3 2 To the extent that workers and their leaders seek to regain
and expand the autonomy and influence they lost during the era of scien-
28. Scholars across the ideological spectrum recognize expertise based on intellectual training as a
distinguishing characteristic of professionals. Talcott Parsons provides a classic definition of the key
criterion of professional status: "formal technical training accompanied by some institutionalized mode
of validating both the adequacy of the training and the competence of trained individuals." Parsons,
Professions, in 12 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 536 (D. Sills ed.
1968); see also E. FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL POWERS 20-38 (1986) (discussing how to identify pro-
fessions). Radical attacks on traditional interpretations of professions also acknowledge this distinctive
characteristic. See, e.g., M. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALIsMi 31-32 (1977) (knowledge ac-
cessible through prolonged training basis of professional expertise). Rabban, supra note 1, provides an
overview of the scholarly literature on professionalism and discusses the similarities and differences
among various professions.
29. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(12)(a)(iv) (1982) (NLRA definition of professional employee citing ad-
vanced knowledge based on "specialized intellectual instruction"); id. at § 159(b)(1) (separate unit for
professional employees unless majority of them votes for inclusion in broader unit with other
employees).
30. Perhaps the relative ease in identifying professional employees can be traced to the legislative
history of the original statutory provision covering them. This history emphasized that the drafters
had been "careful in framing a definition to cover only strictly professional groups such as engineers,
chemists, scientists, architects, and nurses." S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1947), re-
printed in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947,
at 407, 425 (1948) [hereinafter LEG. HIST. LMRA]; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 36 (1947), reprinted in I LEG. HisT. LMRA, supra, at 505, 540 (definition of professional
employee "covers such persons as legal, engineering, scientific and medical personnel").
31. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1947) reprinted in I LEG. HIST. LMRA, supra
note 30, at 407, 417 (justifying availability of separate units for professional employees by citing their
"great community of interest in maintaining certain professional standards").
32. A. GOULDNER, THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUALS AND THE RISE OF THE NEW CLASS 20
(1979).
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tific management in the early twentieth century,33 labor laws designed for
professional employees might be appropriate for them as well. 4
I. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MANDATORY AND PERMISSIVE
SUBJECTS OF BARGAINING
The Wagner Act passed in 1935 did not define the scope of collective
bargaining. The Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947 added a provision
specifying that the duty to bargain requires the parties "to meet at reason-
able times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms or conditions of employment."3" This obligation, however, "does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession."36 Although the House bill would have limited bargaining to
enumerated subjects to insure that a union would have "no right to bar-
gain with the employer about. . how he shall manage his business,"
37
the provision actually adopted did not contain any explicit language about
the scope of bargaining.
A number of influential commentators urged the NLRB and the courts
to refrain from construing the statutory phrase "terms and conditions of
employment" as a license to define the scope of bargaining for the parties.
They worried that such a license would encourage members of the Board
and judges to reintroduce their own values into labor-management rela-
tions, the very problem that plagued legal regulation of labor disputes
before the passage of modern federal labor legislation. Archibald Cox, one
of the most vigorous proponents of this view, pointed out that judges tra-
ditionally had "a narrow view of the proper objectives of labor activi-
ties."3" Judges sitting in equity had frequently cited improper objectives
as the basis for enjoining strikes. Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia
33. See D. MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR 214-56 (1987).
34. It is noteworthy that several recent general studies of labor law in the industrial sector have
recommended, though without elaboration, changes in the same legal doctrines that I discuss in con-
nection with professional employment. See, e.g., C. HECKSCHER, THE NEW UNIONISM 8-9, 77-81,
224 (1988) (current legal framework-including exclusive representation, clear line between exempt
managers and nonexempt workers, and arbitrary line between working conditions and managerial
domain-freezes industrial relations and inhibits needed changes); T. KOCHAN, H. KATZ & R.
McKERsIE, supra note 25, at 234-36 (innovations in industrial relations "challenge" doctrines of
employer domination, exclusive representation, distinctions between workers and supervisors, and dis-
tinctions among bargaining subjects); BUREAU OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 26,
at 66 (highlighting threats to cooperative labor relations posed by potentially broad definition of
"manager" in Yeshiva, by concepts of company domination and exclusive representation, and by nar-
row scope of bargaining); id. at 25 ("removing the artificial distinction between mandatory and per-
missive subjects" should be explored); Sockell, supra note 27, at 555-56 (suggesting re-interpretation
of current NLRA provision on exclusivity and investigation of possible elimination of distinction be-
tween mandatory and permissive bargaining subjects).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
36. Id.
37. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23 (1947), reprinted in I LEG. HIST. LMRA,
supra note 30, at 292, 313-14.




Act and the NLRA to end the practice of "judging the legality of con-
certed action by its purpose."3 9 Yet in Cox's view, a restrictive definition
of the scope of bargaining would reintroduce "the same kind of objectives
test as the equity judges" had used.40 Cox therefore urged that the new
statutory language in the Taft-Hartley Amendments be read to require
bargaining over all proposals "not inconsistent with a federal statute or
declared public policy.""' This interpretation, he added, "would seem to
be in keeping with the basic philosophy of collective bargaining, for if
either side feels strongly enough about a proposal to press it to an im-
passe, it is better to have full discussion and agreement under economic
pressure than to attempt to conceal the issue by legal repression." '42
The Board and the courts did not take this advice. Instead, the Board
construed the Taft-Hartley provision as confirming the distinction be-
tween mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining that it had begun
to develop while interpreting the original Wagner Act.4 The Supreme
Court endorsed the Board's approach in its landmark 1958 decision,
NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp.4 The Court held that
the duty to bargain in good faith extends only to mandatory subjects. Ei-
ther party may propose additional subjects in negotiations, but the other
party need not bargain about them. Moreover, insistence on the resolution
of a non-mandatory subject as a condition to an overall agreement violates
the duty to bargain in good faith. According to the majority, "such con-
duct is, in substance, a refusal to bargain about the subjects that are
within the scope of mandatory bargaining."' 5 The Supreme Court subse-
quently made clear that the duty to bargain in good faith precludes unilat-
eral employer action regarding mandatory subjects before negotiating to
impasse with the union.
4
39. Id. at 1086.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. See generally H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PRoCESS 63-90 (1968) (parties,
not NLRB and courts, should determine subjects of bargaining).
43. See St. Antoine, Legal Barriers to Worker Participation in Management Decision Making,
58 TUL. L. REV. 1301, 1304-05 (1984).
44. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
45. Id. at 349. In dissent, Justice Harlan protested that without the freedom to insist on a propo-
sal, the "right to bargain becomes illusory." Id. at 352 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part, concurring in
part). Justice Harlan accepted the distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects and agreed
with the majority that the duty to bargain extends only to mandatory subjects. But Justice Harlan
would not have prohibited insistence on a permissive subject during negotiations. In Justice Harlan's
view, either party should be able to insist on permissive subjects, but neither party should be required
to bargain about them. Id. at 353-54. The majority's prohibition against insistence on permissive
subjects, he feared, would impede the "evolving character of collective bargaining agreements" and
lead to their "premature crystallization." Id. at 358-59. As an unfortunate result, the collective bar-
gaining process would be less adaptable "to the changing needs of our society and to the changing
concepts of the responsibilities of labor and management." Id. at 359.
46. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). "Unilateral action by an employer without prior discus-
sion with the union," the Court observed, "does amount to a refusal to negotiate about the affected
conditions of employment under negotiation, and must of necessity obstruct bargaining, contrary to the
congressional policy." Id. at 747.
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The Supreme Court's most recent elaboration of the distinction between
mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining, First National Mainte-
nance Corporation v. NLRB,"' stressed that "in establishing what issues
must be submitted to the process of bargaining, Congress had no expecta-
tion that the elected union representative would become an equal partner
in the running of the business enterprise in which the union's members
are employed."4 The Court identified three categories of management de-
cisions: those that "have only an indirect and attenuated impact on the
employment relationship," those that "are almost exclusively 'an aspect of
the relationship' between employer and employee," and those that have "a
direct impact on employment" but are based on concerns of "economic
profitability. . . wholly apart from the employment relationship."" 9 The
first category is permissive, the second is mandatory, and the third de-
pends on a balancing test. Recognizing "an employer's need for unencum-
bered decision-making," the Court announced that bargaining over issues
in the third category is mandatory "only if the benefit, for labor-
management relations and the collective-bargaining process, outweighs the
burden placed on the conduct of the business. ' O The Court added that
bargaining over the effects of a management decision on employees is
mandatory even when the decision itself concerns a permissive subject.5 '
The recent passage and interpretation of legislation governing public
employees has led to limitations on the scope of mandatory bargaining
that are similar to, and often greater than, those the NLRA imposes in
the private sector. Statutes and decisions in the public sector have incorpo-
rated the deference to managerial prerogatives that emerged in decisions
construing the NLRA. They also have recognized as an additional con-
cern in the public sector the possibility that the legitimate interests of citi-
zens would be jeopardized if issues of public policy are resolved through
collective bargaining. For example, the curriculum of the public schools is
important to parents as well as teachers, and disciplinary procedures for
police misconduct concern members of the community as well as police
officers.
A typical decision distinguishing mandatory from permissive subjects of
bargaining in the public sector focuses on whether the impact of an issue
on employment conditions outweighs its probable effect on basic policy.52
Other cases, without using an explicit balancing test, examine whether a
47. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
48. Id. at 676.
49. Id. at 677 (quoting Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157,
178 (1971)).
50. Id. at 679.
51. Id. at 681-82.
52. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 507, 337
A.2d 262, 268 (1975).
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particular issue is primarily,53 predominantly,54 or significantly related
to,55 or has a more direct impact upon, 56 policy or conditions of employ-
ment. In some public sector jurisdictions, bargaining over issues that relate
primarily to policy is prohibited, and not simply permissive. These juris-
dictions reason that citizens have a right to meaningful participation in
the determination of such issues and that this right would be denied if a
public employer voluntarily committed them to the collective bargaining
process.5" Even if the decision itself is a permissive or prohibited subject,
bargaining over its impact on employees, as in the private sector, is gener-
ally mandatory.58
A. Defining the Scope of Bargaining in Professional Employment
Decisions addressing the scope of bargaining reveal that labor boards
and courts in both the private and public sectors have defined only a rela-
tively narrow range of professional concerns as mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining. Most of this litigation has occurred in cases brought by unions of
public school teachers or of university professors. Cases define many issues
of substantial professional interest as outside the scope of mandatory bar-
gaining, including curriculum,59 student-faculty ratio, ° policies on aca-
demic freedom and professional ethics,61 and decisions to hire, promote,
award tenure, and retrench.62 Only the narrowest working conditions
seem clearly mandatory, such as salary, supplementary employment, and
rules governing travel out of state.63 With respect to other issues, holdings
53. Beloit Educ. Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 54, 242
N.W.2d 231, 236 (1976).
54. Dunellen Bd. of Educ. v. Dunellen Educ. Ass'n, 64 N.J. 17, 29, 311 A.2d 737, 743 (1973).
55. Clark County School Dist. v. Local Gov't Employee Management Relations Bd., 90 Nev.
442, 446-47, 530 P.2d 114, 117 (1974).
56. National Educ., Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 212 Kan. 741, 753, 512 P.2d 426, 435 (1973).
57. See, e.g., Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J. 144, 162-66,
393 A.2d 278, 287-89 (1978); Kenai Peninsula Borough School Dist. v. Kenai Peninsula Educ. Ass'n,
572 P.2d 416, 419 (Alaska 1977). Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83
YALE L.J. 1156, 1192-97 (1974), emphasizes the threat to democratic values inherent in channeling
discussions of politically sensitive issues regarding public sector employment into closed bargaining
sessions.
58. See, e.g., Hillsborough Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. School Bd. of Hillsborough County, 423
So. 2d 969, 969-70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); West Irondequoit Teachers Ass'n v. Helsby, 35
N.Y.2d 46, 51-52, 358 N.Y.S.2d 720, 723 (1974).
59. E.g., Colonial School Bd. v. Colonial Affiliate, NCCEA/DSEA/NEA, 449 A.2d 243 (Del.
1982); Kenai Peninsula Borough School Dist., 572 P.2d 416; National Educ. Ass'n, 212 Kan. 741,
512 P.2d 426; Dunellen Bd. of Educ. v. Dunellen Educ. Ass'n, 64 N.J. 17, 311 A.2d 737 (1973);
School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 188 Neb. 772, 199 N.W.2d. 752 (1972).
60. E.g., Rutgers Council of Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. New Jersey Bd. of Higher Educ.,
126 N.J. Super. 53, 312 A.2d 677 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973).
61. E.g., Kansas Bd. of Regents v. Pittsburg State Univ. Chapter of Kan.-Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 233
Kan. 801, 808, 667 P.2d 306, 312 (1983); National Educ. Ass'n, 212 Kan. 741, 512 P.2d 426.
62. E.g., Charles City Educ. Ass'n v. Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 291 N.W.2d 663 (Iowa
1980); Tri-County Educators' Ass'n v. Tri-County Special Educ. Coop., 225 Kan. 781, 594 P.2d 207
(1979); Beloit Educ. Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 242 N.W.2d
231 (1976); School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n, 188 Neb. 772, 199 N.W.2d 752.
63. See, e.g., Kansas Bd. of Regents, 233 Kan. 801, 826-28, 667 P.2d 306, 324-25. See generally
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vary among jurisdictions. Mandatory subjects of bargaining in one state
may be permissive or even prohibited in another. Examples include class
size,64 workload," student discipline," calendar,
67 in-service training,68
standards and procedures for teacher evaluation, 9 faculty governance, 0
and guidelines for promotion, tenure, and retrenchment. 1
Commonwealth v. Commonwealth of Pa., Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 82 Pa. Commw. 330, 474 A.2d
1213 (1984); Metropolitan Technical Community College Educ. Ass'n v. Metropolitan Technical
Community College Area, 203 Neb. 832, 281 N.W.2d 201 (1979); Beloit Educ. Ass'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43,
242 N.W.2d 231.
64. Compare Kenai Peninsula Borough School Dist. v. Kenai Peninsula Educ. Ass'n, 572 P.2d
416, 423 (Alaska 1977) (nonnegotiable) and Beloit Educ. Ass'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 63-64, 242 N.W.2d
231, 240-41 (permissive) and West Irondequoit Teachers Ass'n v. Helsby, 35 N.Y.2d 46, 49-51, 358
N.Y.S.2d 720, 722-23 (1974) (nonnegotiable) and National Educ. Ass'n of Shawnee Mission, 212
Kan. 741, 749, 512 P.2d 426, 435 (nonnegotiable) with Boston Teachers Union v. School Comm., 370
Mass. 455, 462-63, 350 N.E.2d 707, 714 (1976) (mandatory) and Clark County School Dist. v.
Local Gov't Employee-Management Relations Bd., 90 Nev. 442, 447-49, 530 P.2d 114, 118-19
(1974) (mandatory) and West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 586, 295 A.2d
526, 537 (1972) (mandatory).
65. Compare Kenai Peninsula Borough School Dist., 572 P.2d 416, 422-23 (nonnegotiable) with
Boston Teachers Union, 370 Mass. 455, 462-63, 350 N.E.2d 707, 714 (mandatory) and Clark
County School Dist., 90 Nev. 442, 448-49, 530 P.2d 114, 118-19 (negotiable) and West Hartford
Educ. Ass'n, 162 Conn. 566, 586, 295 A.2d 526, 537 (mandatory).
66. See Beloit Educ. Ass'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 60-61, 242 N.W.2d 231, 239 (student misbehavior a
mandatory subject only when it threatens physical safety). Compare Colonial School Bd. v. Colonial
Affiliate NCCEA/DSEA/NEA, 449 A.2d 243 (Del. 1982) (proposed committee to develop proce-
dures in student disciplinary matters illegal) with Clark County School Dist., 90 Nev. 442, 448-49,
530 P.2d 114, 118-19 (treatment of students causing disciplinary problems mandatory).
67. Compare Burlington County Faculty Ass'n v. Burlington County College, 64 N.J. 10, 13, 311
A.2d 733, 735 (1973) (not mandatory) and City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d
387, 403 (Me. 1973) (nonnegotiable) with Westwood Community Schools, 1972 MERC Lab. Op.
313 (Mich. Employment Relations Comm'n), reprinted in H. EDWARDS, R. CLARK & C. CRAVER,
LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, 312, 314-15 (3d ed. 1985) (mandatory) and City of
Madison v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 37 Wis. 2d 483, 492, 155 N.W.2d 78, 82, 81-84
(1967) (mandatory).
68. Compare Beloit Educ. Ass'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 62-63, 242 N.W.2d 231, 240 (not mandatory)
with Charles City Educ. Ass'n v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 291 N.W.2d 663, 667 (Iowa
1980) (mandatory) and Chee-Craw Teachers Ass'n v. Unified School Dist., 225 Kan. 561, 570, 593
P.2d 406, 413 (1979) (mandatory).
69. See, e.g., Tri-County Educ. Ass'n v. Tri-County Special Educ. Coop., 225 Kan. 781, 784-85,
594 P.2d 207, 210 (1979) (not mandatory); Springfield Educ. Ass'n v. Springfield School Dist., 290
Or. 217, 220, 239, 621 P.2d 547, 551, 562 (1980) (bases and mechanics of evaluation permissive but
fairness of procedures mandatory); Beloit Educ. Ass'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 55-56, 242 N.W.2d 231, 237
(who evaluates teachers and nature of assistance to teachers with poor evaluations not mandatory but
procedures used in evaluation-such as length and frequency of evaluations, notification, and report-
ing results-mandatory); Clark County School Dist., 90 Nev. 442, 448-49, 530 P.2d 114, 118-19
(manner of evaluating teacher performance mandatory).
70. Compare In re Keene State College Educ. Ass'n, 120 N.H. 32, 37, 411 A.2d 156, 160 (1980)
(not mandatory) with Vermont State Colleges Faculty Fed'n v. Vermont State Colleges, 138 Vt. 451,
456-57, 418 A.2d 34, 37-38 (1980) (mandatory). The former general counsel of the NLRB and
public sector labor boards in New York, New Jersey, and Michigan have all indicated that matters of
governance are permissive subjects. Feller & Finkin, Legislative Issues in Faculty Collective Bargain-
ing, in FACULTY BARGAINING IN PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION 73, 134-37 (Carnegie Council on
Policy Studies in Pub. Higher Education ed. 1977).
71. See Council of N.J. State College Locals v. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 91 N.J. 18, 25-33, 449
A.2d 1244, 1248-51 (1982) (substantive criteria for retrenchment nonnegotiable but procedures for
implementing decisions mandatory). Compare Kansas Bd. of Regents v. Pittsburg State Univ. Chapter
of Kan.-Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 233 Kan. 801, 823-25, 667 P.2d 306, 322-24 (1983) (criteria for promo-
tion, tenure, and retrenchment mandatory) with Association of N.J. State College Faculties v. Dun-
gan, 64 N.J. 338, 352-56, 316 A.2d 425, 433-35 (1974) (tenure guidelines not mandatory).
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The few litigated cases involving other professionals have generally re-
inforced the restrictive definition of mandatory subjects reflected in the
education cases. A labor board in New York City determined that the
level of staff and equipment in hospitals and standards of patient care are
not mandatory subjects. In response to claims by a union of interns and
residents that low standards risked loss of hospital accreditation, violations
of principles of professional conduct, and reduced opportunities for profes-
sional advancement, the board observed that these problems go beyond the
employer-employee relationship.72 State courts construing statutes gov-
erning public employees have divided on whether social workers' caseloads
are mandatory subjects related to working conditions or permissive issues
of policy,7 ' and the NLRB has held that a publisher's imposition of a
code of ethics on reporters may be permissive in some circumstances but
mandatory in others.
7 4
Many unions representing professional employees, assuming that pro-
fessional issues would be declared nonmandatory, have not even contested
employer refusals to bargain about them. Unions preferred saving these
issues for future negotiations over suffering expected legal defeats that
might reinforce employer reluctance to discuss them at all. In several in-
stances when employers refused to renew important provisions from prior
agreements-such as union membership on the governing board of a mu-
seum, or the obligation of a symphony orchestra to select the conductor
from a list submitted by the union-the unions, convinced that they would
lose any litigation, acquiesced. Employer representatives tend to agree
72. In re City of N.Y., Bd. of Collective Bargaining Decision No. B-10-81 (1981) (opinion on file
with author). The Board did recognize as mandatory subjects the performance of out-of-title work,
time off between shifts, and maximum hours. Yet it cautioned that possible changes in staffing to meet
negotiated provisions on these mandatory subjects, as well as the definition of out-of-title work, re-
mained managerial prerogatives outside the scope of required bargaining. Id. The Michigan constitu-
tion guarantees the autonomy of the University of Michigan Board of Regents in matters of educa-
tional policy. This constitutional provision led the state supreme court to limit the scope of bargaining
with a union of interns and residents at the University of Michigan hospital. Because hours of train-
ing affect the quality of medical education, the court reasoned, they could not constitutionally become
a mandatory subject of bargaining. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Michigan Employment Relations
Comm'n, 389 Mich. 96, 106, 204 N.W.2d 218, 224 (1973).
73. Compare Joint Bargaining Comm. of the Pa. Social Serv. Union v. Pennsylvania Labor Rela-
tions Bd., 503 Pa. 236, 469 A.2d 150 (1983) (not mandatory) with Los Angeles Court Employees
Ass'n, Local No. 660 v. County of L.A., 33 Cal. App. 3d 1, 108 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1973) (mandatory).
74. See Peerless Publications, Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. 334, 335-37 (1987). In its initial exposure to
this issue, the Board held that the code itself was a permissive subject but that its penalty provisions
were mandatory. Capital Times Co., 223 N.L.R.B. 651 (1976). Although the Board relied on Capital
Times in the first Peerless case, 231 N.L.R.B. 244, 245 (1977), the District of Columbia Circuit
rejected this distinction on review, reasoning that penalties cannot be separated "from the substantive
provisions which they are designed to enforce." The court remanded the case to the Board to deter-
mine whether particular subjects covered by the code of ethics are mandatory or not. Newspaper
Guild v. NLRB, 636 F.2d 550, 564-65 (D.C. Cir. 1980). On remand, the Board agreed with the
court's reasoning and overruled Capital Times and its first Peerless decision to the extent that they
held otherwise. 283 N.L.R.B. at 334-35 & n.4. The Board concluded that the code of ethics in
Peerless should have been part of mandatory bargaining, but made clear that other codes of ethics
could be permissive subjects if they relate to "the credibility of the institution and/or the quality of its
product" and "do not improperly infringe on the relevant rights of the affected employees." Id. at 337.
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with this legal view, although some emphasize their willingness-based
on respect for the professional competence of their employees-to discuss
and even incorporate in collective bargaining agreements reasonable union
proposals on nonmandatory, professional issues."5
Even in jurisdictions in which the statutory duty to bargain in good
faith refers explicitly to "terms and conditions of professional service" ' or
matters pertaining to "the fulfillment of . . . professional duties,"7 7 the
scope of mandatory bargaining has not been broadened substantially. One
judicial reading of such language has defined mandatory subjects as
"something more than the minimal economic terms of wages and hours,
but something less than the basic educational policies of the board of edu-
cation. "78 Responding to a union's claim that the statutory reference to
professional matters should encourage an expansive interpretation of
mandatory bargaining, another court reiterated the general concern about
assigning too many issues to the collective bargaining process. "If teachers'
unions are permitted to bargain on matters of educational policy," the
court reasoned, "it is conceivable that through successive contracts the au-
tonomy of the school boards could be severely eroded, and the effective
control of educational policy shifted from the school boards to the teachers'
unions."'7 9 The court warned that this result could undermine the ability
of school boards and administrators, who are responsible to the electorate,
"to perform their functions in the broad public interest."'
Labor boards and courts occasionally encourage governing boards and
administrators to consult with professional employees and their unions
about the very issues these legal decision-makers have excluded from the
scope of mandatory bargaining. For example, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey ruled that a school board's decision to consolidate the chairs of two
departments into one position was an illegal subject of bargaining. Yet the
court immediately added that its holding, while required by the statutory
scheme entrusting matters of educational policy to the school board,
should not be understood to preclude voluntary discussions about policy
issues with teachers and their union representatives. The court observed
that teachers, "as trained professionals, may have much to contribute to-
wards the Board's adoption of sound and suitable educational policies."8"
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin recognized that a teachers'
union is both a collective bargaining agent and a professional association.
75. These comments derive from interviews with union and management lawyers who agreed to
speak only on a confidential basis.
76. E.g., National Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ. 212 Kan. 741, 741, 512 P.2d 426, 427 (1973)
(quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5413(g) (1985)).
77. E.g., Kenai Peninsula Borough School Dist. v. Kenai Peninsula Educ. Ass'n, 572 P.2d 416,
417 (Alaska 1977) (quoting ALsKA STAT. § 14.20.550 (1987)).
78. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 212 Kan. at 741, 512 P.2d at 427.
79. Kenai Peninsula Borough School Dist., 572 P.2d at 419.
80. Id.
81. Dunellen Bd. of Educ. v. Dunellen Educ. Ass'n, 64 N.J. 17, 32, 311 A.2d 737, 744 (1973).
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The court stressed that the union's role as an agent, while limited by the
scope of bargaining, does not preclude it from functioning as a profes-
sional association and expressing its views about educational policies. But
in the capacity of a professional association, the organization cannot take
advantage of the principle of exclusive representation and restrict discus-
sion to the bargaining table. Rather, it must make its voice heard "along
with other groups and individuals similarly concerned." 2
Several cases demonstrate vividly the adverse impact on professional
values caused by applying the legal distinction between mandatory and
permissive or prohibited subjects of bargaining. A judicial holding that
governance is a nonmandatory subject allowed a university, after the elec-
tion of a faculty union, to abolish the prior system of faculty committees
without bargaining with the union.8 3 Similar reasoning supported the re-
fusal of employers even to discuss union requests for faculty participation
on promotion review committees 4 or for joint committees of teachers and
school administrators to deal with subjects such as student discipline, se-
lection of administrators, curriculum, and in-service programs.
8 5
B. Experience Under "Meet and Confer" Provisions
As part of an effort to limit the scope of mandatory bargaining while
retaining professional input into major issues of policy, some state legisla-
tion governing collective bargaining in the public sector contains "meet
and confer" provisions intended to supplement the traditional negotiating
process.88 These provisions typically require the employer to "meet and
confer" with representatives of employees about issues of professional con-
cern that are not mandatory subjects of bargaining. Unlike collective bar-
gaining negotiations, "meet and confer" sessions are not expected to lead
to legally enforceable agreements. At least in theory, professional employ-
ees can give their expert advice, which may benefit the employer and the
general public, without jeopardizing the employer's managerial preroga-
tives or citizens' interests in meaningful participation regarding matters of
public concern.
Unfortunately, these well-intentioned "meet and confer" provisions do
not seem to have accomplished their purposes. They are often either inef-
fective or indistinguishable from collective bargaining. "Meet and confer"
provisions can relegate unions to the role of impotent discussant rather
than the equal negotiator contemplated by true collective bargaining.
82. Beloit Educ. Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 52, 242
N.W.2d 231, 235 (1976).
83. In re Keene State College Educ. Ass'n, 120 N.H. 32, 411 A.2d 156 (1980).
84. Rutgers v. Rutgers Council, Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, N.J. Public Employment Rela-
tions Comm'n No. 76-13 at 12-14 (1976) (opinion on file with author).
85. Colonial School Bd. v. Colonial Affiliate, NCCEA/DSEA/NEA, 449 A.2d 243 (Del. 1982).
86. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543.2 (West 1980); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965(1)(C)
(1988).
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Without the requirement of reaching enforceable agreements in good
faith, these advisory sessions often amount to no more than "collective
begging" easily ignored by the employer. Eventually, the very "meet and
confer" process may atrophy. On the other hand, the theoretical differ-
ences between "meet and confer" sessions and collective bargaining nego-
tiations often evaporate in practice. The scope of bargaining frequently
expands with the duration of the relationship between the union and the
employer. Issues originally addressed in "meet and confer" sessions even-
tually become part of collective bargaining negotiations."'
The Supreme Court's decision in Minnesota State Board for Commu-
nity Colleges v. Knight"8 illustrates the difficulty of using "meet and con-
fer" provisions to preserve independent professional influence within a
system of collective bargaining, particularly when the exclusive union rep-
resentative designates the employee representatives in the "meet and con-
fer" sessions. The Minnesota statute construed in Knight made clear that
"educational policies" are outside the scope of mandatory bargaining.8 9
Yet the statute simultaneously required the public employer to "meet and
confer with professional employees" about these educational policies and
any other nonmandatory subjects,90 reasoning that "professional employ-
ees possess knowledge, expertise, and dedication which is helpful and nec-
essary to the operation and quality of public services and which may assist
public employers in developing their policies."'" Significantly, the statute
also provided that the election of an exclusive representative within an
appropriate bargaining unit required the employer to deal only with the
union and precluded any participation by other professional employees,
individually or in groups, in "meet and confer" as well as in collective
bargaining sessions.
9 2
The exclusive representative elected by faculty in the Minnesota com-
87. See H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 146, 150 (1971); Ed-
wards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MICH. L. REV. 885, 896, 901 (1973);
Edwards, An Overview of the "Meet and Confer" States-Where Are We Going?, 16 LAW
QUADRANGLE NOTES 10, 10 (Winter 1972) ("Most critics of the 'meet and confer' model argue that
it forces a union to engage in 'collective begging' in place of collective bargaining in the public
sector.").
A thorough study of the evolution of the relationship between the teachers' union and the board of
education in New York City found that the union effectively expanded the scope of collective bargain-
ing from relatively narrow working conditions to broader policy issues. The union convinced the
board to abolish many forms of joint consultation between teachers and the administration that ante-
dated the union and did not formally include it, and to incorporate many of these issues within the
collective bargaining process. The union soon became a major factor in school administration through
both collective bargaining and regular bilateral consultation with the board of education. Klaus, The
Evolution of a Collective Bargaining Relationship in Public Education: New York City's Changing
Seven-Year History, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1042-52 (1969).
88. 465 U.S. 271 (1984).
89. 1971 Minn. Laws-Extra Session, ch. 33, § 3, subd. 18 (repealed by 1984 Minn. Laws, ch.
462, § 28).
90. Id. at § 6, subd. 3 (repealed by 1984 Minn. Laws, ch. 462, § 28).
91. Id. at § 13, subd. 1 (repealed by 1984 Minn. Laws, ch. 462, § 28).
92. Id. at § 6, subd. 7 (repealed by 1984 Minn. Laws, ch. 462, § 28).
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munity college system negotiated a collective bargaining agreement that
established state and local "meet and confer" committees as the sole fo-
rums for the expression of official faculty views. The agreement required
abolishing the faculty senates that previously had existed at some cam-
puses, and the union selected only its own members to serve on "meet and
confer" committees.9" Yet the governing board and administrators gener-
ally provided opportunities for other faculty members to supplement the
official views on various issues of academic governance conveyed through
these committees.94
Faculty members in the bargaining unit who chose not to join the union
claimed that the new scheme constituted a departure from generally ac-
cepted and convincingly justified professional traditions of faculty govern-
ance.95 The Court majority conceded that these faculty members had a
substantially less effective role in university governance than the partici-
pants in the "meet and confer" process.9" Yet the majority was unmoved
by dissenters' arguments derived from general principles of First Amend-
ment interpretation 97 and from the specific First Amendment protection
for academic freedom.9" It simply concluded that these laudable traditions
do not amount to a constitutional right limiting the scope of collective
bargaining or "meet and confer" provisions.99 The Court therefore upheld
the statute and the labor agreement while acknowledging their adverse
impact on the professional influence of professors outside the union struc-
ture. "Faculty involvement in academic governance," the Court concluded,
"has much to recommend it as a matter of academic policy, but it finds no
basis in the Constitution."' 0
C. The Recommended Elimination of the Distinction in Professional
Employment
The distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargain-
ing should be abolished in the context of professional employment. By
placing so many issues of professional concern outside the scope of
mandatory bargaining, this distinction inhibits the use of collective bar-
gaining to support and enforce professional values. As the original oppo-
nents of the distinction warned, 01 legal restrictions on the subjects of
93. Knight, 465 U.S. at 275-76.
94. Id. at 276 n.3, 276-78.
95. Id. at 287-88.
96. Id. at 288.
97. Id. at 300-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 295-300 (Brennan J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 287-88.
100. Id. at 288.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 38-42; see also Note, Major Operational Decisions and
Free Collective Bargaining: Eliminating the MandatorylPermissive Distinction, 102 HARV. L. REv.
1971, 1986-88 (1989) (advocating replacement of mandatory/permissive distinction with subjective
good faith standard rather than with mandatory bargaining over every subject).
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mandatory bargaining have allowed labor boards and courts to impose
their values on the collective bargaining relationship. The view that issues
of fundamental policy are managerial prerogatives underlies the distinc-
tion and derives from assumptions about the limited role of industrial em-
ployees. This view is inconsistent with the goals of professional employees,
who claim persuasively that they have a legitimate and socially useful role
to play in determining policies related to their professional expertise,
whether or not these policies affect narrowly defined terms of employ-
ment. Indeed, most professional employees consider input into such policy
issues an important condition of professional employment."0 2
The Supreme Court's implication that mandatory negotiations about
policy issues would make the union "an equal partner"'0 3 in running an
organization, moreover, is simply incorrect. As the NLRA and compara-
ble state legislation make clear, mandatory bargaining does not compel
agreement. Employers are free, after good faith bargaining, unilaterally to
adopt positions rejected by the union during negotiations. Mandatory bar-
gaining does increase union power and restrict managerial flexibility by
requiring employers to negotiate before they act. But mandatory bargain-
102. See, e.g., J. BLAU, ARCHITECTS AND FIRMS 24-45, 51, 53, 59 (1984) (importance to archi-
tects of "voice" in organizational decision-making and correlation between voice and commitment); P.
BLAU, THE ORGANIZATION OF ACADEMIC WORK 164, 193, 277-78 (1973) (desire by faculty for
influence in educational and appointment decisions); A. GOULDNER, supra note 32, at 20 (unlike
working class, "new class" of professional employees seeks to control content and quality of work); W.
KORNHAUSER, SCIENTISTS IN INDUSTRY: CONFLICT AND ACCOMMODATION 17-42, 197 (1963) (at-
tempts by industrial scientists to achieve professional goals, including formulation of research policy);
H. MINTZBERG, POWER IN AND AROUND ORGANIZATIONS 132-34 (1983) (efforts by professional
employees to influence organizational policies traced to their identification of organizational mission
with professional goals).
Derber, Managing Professionals: Ideological Proletarianization and Mental Labor, in PROFES-
SIONALS AS WORKERS: MENTAL LABOR IN ADVANCED CAPITALISM 167, 188 (C. Derber ed. 1982),
claims that professional employees, while maintaining substantially more technical discretion than
industrial workers, "are increasingly stripped of authority to select their own projects or clients and to
make major budgetary and policy decisions." As a result, he maintains, some professional employees
have engaged in "a kind of ideological Luddism that involves routine bending or breaking rules to aid
clients and assert at least marginal control over the objectives and directions of one's work with cli-
ents." Id. at 179. M. LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY 20-21 (1980), similarly reports that
doctors, overcoming efforts by the Veterans Administration hospital system to limit their discretion,
managed to manipulate bureaucratic rules "to impose their views of proper treatment on the
organization."
E. FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL CARE 182-83,
211 (1970), warns against too much professional influence in organizations. He advocates restricting
"medical dominance" to matters "having a technical or scientific rationale" and argues that hospital
administrators should protect patient choice against professional control that is not based on expertise.
Freidson ends another book by expressing his opinion that:
[Tihe professions' role in a free society should be limited to contributing the technical informa-
tion men need to make their own decisions on the basis of their own values. When he preempts
the authority to direct, even constrain men's decisions on the basis of his own values, the
professional is no longer an expert but rather a member of a new privileged class disguised as
expert.
E. FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE, A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED KNOWLEDGE
382 (1970).
103. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676 (1981).
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ing does not, as the term "equal partner" suggests, oblige employers to
obtain union concurrence before making decisions.
Eliminating legal restrictions on the scope of mandatory bargaining
would therefore require employers to negotiate about policy issues of pro-
fessional concern without ceding their final authority to determine these
issues themselves. It would end the practical difficulty-and the associated
confusion, litigation, and conflicting results-inherent in making necessa-
rily fine judgments about whether or not a subject is mandatory. It also
supports the principle of free collective bargaining without government
interference that underlies the NLRA.'04 The failure of "meet and con-
fer" provisions to solve these problems provides further support for elimi-
nating the underlying distinction between mandatory and permissive sub-
jects in both the private and public sectors.
Expanding the scope of mandatory bargaining to cover policy issues of
professional concern could be accomplished without abolishing entirely the
category of nonmandatory subjects. One could argue, for example, that
professors should be able to require bargaining about educational policy
but not about university investment decisions. In addition, issues of profes-
sional concern to one profession could plausibly be deemed beyond the
legitimate interests of other professions. The differences in background
and training between doctors and nurses could justify a greater scope of
mandatory bargaining over certain health care issues for doctors.10 5 Yet
differentiating policy issues of professional concern from other policy is-
sues, especially if this distinction varies with the profession involved, per-
petuates the difficult and often unpredictable task of sorting bargaining
issues into categories that determine important legal rights. My proposal
to require bargaining over all subjects avoids this major problem. In prac-
tice, moreover, I believe that unions of professional employees are unlikely
to press for contractual provisions on matters that are well beyond conven-
tional professional concerns.
Some fear that expanding mandatory bargaining would destroy effective
mechanisms outside union control that facilitate professional influence on
organizational policy.106 For example, if governance were a mandatory
104. See Note, supra note 101.
105. For example, control over discharging a patient or referring a patient to an outside consult-
ant might be considered appropriate subjects of bargaining for physicians, but not for nurses.
106. It is noteworthy that the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education rejected
the proposal on the scope of bargaining by the authors of an essay it commissioned. Professors Feller
and Finkin come close to advocating the abolition of the mandatory/permissive distinction so that
faculty unions could bargain over issues of educational policy and governance. They stress that the
bargaining unit must reflect the traditional constituency for faculty governance to make their proposal
work. Feller & Finkin, supra note 70, at 130-31, 140-41, 164-70. Cf infra note 120 (emphasizing
importance of bargaining unit consisting of professional employees).
The Carnegie Council observed that it "might accept the expansive approach to bargainable issues"
recommended by Feller and Finkin if it had more confidence that laws would define faculty bargain-
ing units by traditional governance constituencies. Beyond expressing doubt that such conformity
would occur, the Carnegie Council worried that any bargaining over issues of governance and educa-
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subject, the union might preempt and even force the abolition of collegial
bodies such as faculty senates, councils of doctors and nurses, artistic advi-
sory committees in symphony orchestras, and other consultative bodies of
professionals."' 7 On the other hand, case law demonstrates that declaring
governance a permissive subject, by allowing employers unilaterally to
abolish or to refuse to implement these collegial structures, can also un-
dermine traditional means of professional influence.108
Free collective bargaining, of course, cannot force either side to agree to
provisions that support professional values. But broadening the scope of
collective bargaining to include what are now permissive or prohibited
policy issues seems better adapted to encouraging these values than the
current restrictive definition of mandatory subjects. Some professional em-
ployees and their unions reject professionalism as a bankrupt concept that
has allowed employers to take advantage of their professional employees,
and emulate the industrial model of collective bargaining as a tough, ad-
versarial alternative.1 09 Yet a larger and growing number of professional
tional policy would weaken professional or collegial rights "at the heart of the academic enterprise."
The Council recommended instead that collective bargaining be limited to "items that have a mone-
tary dimension-and that those matters that traditionally constitute the essence of 'academic freedom
and autonomy' should be specifically excluded." Yet the Council would allow a union to bargain
about the establishment of an academic senate. Carnegie Council, Three Key Issues, supra note 9, at
12-15.
107. The collective bargaining agreement challenged in Minnesota Board for Community Col-
leges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 275-76 (1984), replaced faculty senates with the "meet and confer"
sessions controlled by the exclusive union representative. See supra text accompanying note 93. An-
other faculty union negotiated a contract that replaced the faculty senate and peer review committees
with a grievance-arbitration procedure designed to allow union challenges to management decisions
about issues previously addressed by these bodies. Lehmann, The Industrial Model of Academic Col-
lective Bargaining, in CAMPUS BARGAINING AT THE CROSSROADS: PROCEEDINGS, TENTH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE, NATIONAL CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN HIGHER EDU-
CATION AND THE PROFESSIONS 48, 53 (J. Douglas ed. 1982). Unions representing a wide range of
professional employees have negotiated a formal role in various policy and personnel decisions. See
Rabban, supra note 2.
108. See, e.g., Colonial School Bd. v. Colonial Affiliate, NCCEA/DSEA/NEA, 449 A.2d 243
(Del. 1982) (illegal subjects of negotiation include union proposal for instructional council to advise
school superintendent and board of education on curriculum, educational goals, and other topics
deemed appropriate by union); In re Keene State College Educ. Ass'n, 120 N.H. 32, 411 A.2d 156
(1980) (elimination of faculty committees within managerial prerogative of university).
The Carnegie Council, in an apparent attempt to be evenhanded, claimed that its suggested limita-
tions on the scope of faculty bargaining apply to the employer as well as to the union. "The issue is
not just what the union may want to bargain about but also what the 'employer,' however defined,
may want to bargain about." Carnegie Council, Three Key Issues, supra note 9, at 14. Citing actual
experience in higher education, the Council also worried that collective bargaining agreements reserv-
ing management rights may diminish the faculty's appropriate role "by delegating to a board of re-
gents or other 'employer' those decisions that are or should be made at the faculty level." It urged that
laws governing collective bargaining in higher education "make clear that the phrase 'management
rights' is not intended to reduce faculty influence over 'collegial rights.'" Id.
109. See, e.g., Eastabrook, Labor & Librarians: The Divisiveness of Professionalism, LIBR. J.,
Jan. 15, 1981, at 125; Kugler, Creation of a Distinction Between Management and Faculty, in PRO-
CEEDINGS, FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE, NATIONAL CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN HIGHER EDUCATION 67 (M. Benewitz ed. 1973) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS]; Leh-
mann, supra note 107, at 54-55; Wollett, Historical Development of Faculty Collective Bargaining
and Current Extent, in PROCEEDINGS, supra, at 28. See generally Rabban, supra note 3.
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employees and their unions seek collective bargaining as an effective
method to obtain and enforce professional values.110
In fact, many unions representing professional employees have success-
fully negotiated contractual protection for these values, even though many
provisions deal with permissive subjects about which employers need not
bargain. Collective bargaining agreements have guaranteed the participa-
tion of musicians in the personnel decisions of orchestras, 1 periodic fo-
rums in which legal services attorneys can address "issues of project-wide
significance," ' adherence by hospitals to standards of nursing practice
developed by the American Nurses' Association, 1 ' controls by reporters
on revisions of their articles,114 and a wide range of opportunities for
teachers to benefit from professional development.11 Legal enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements, moreover, has invalidated attempts by
university administrators to abolish tenure1 and to decide academic is-
sues without consulting the faculty. 1 7 Under my proposal to transform all
issues of professional concern into mandatory bargaining subjects,"1 ' it
110. See, e.g., L. FLANAGAN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE NURSING PROFESSION 18-25
(American Nurses' Association 1983); T. GUYTON, UNIONIZATION: THE VIEWPOINT OF LIBRARI-
ANS 114-15 (1975); Barwis, Contractual Newsroom Democracy, 57 JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS 1
(1978); Chamot, Professional Employees Turn to Unions, 54 HARV. Bus. REv. 119 (May-June
1976); Council Position on Collective Bargaining, supra note 3, at 46-61; Lightman, Professional-
ization, Bureaucratization, and Unionization in Social Work, 56 Soc. SERV. REv. 130 (1982);
Schorr, Unionization in Legal Services: Beginning the Discussion, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 836,
842 (December 1980).
A participant in the faculty union at Boston University reports that he and the other professors
who ended by committing ourselves to collective bargaining actually began, years earlier, to
attempt reforms in the governance system of the university through traditional means, and our
guide in those early efforts was the AAUP Policy Documents and Reports (Redbook). It was
only when these early efforts failed that we opted for collective bargaining, which we regarded
as a somewhat novel means to attain quite traditional ends.
Ringer, Academic Governance and Collective Bargaining, 66 ACADEME 41, 42 (1980). Professor
Ringer adds more generally that "collective bargaining in the more vulnerable portions of the aca-
demic world has in fact sought the restoration and/or protection of traditional norms of collegial
governance and peer review . . . ." Id. at 43. See generally Rabban, supra note 3.
111. Note, NLRB v. Yeshiva University: The Professional-Managerial Overlap, 32 HASTINGS
L.J. 659, 681-85 (1981).
112. Rabban, supra note 2, at 7-8 (discussing collective bargaining agreements in legal aid
programs).
113. L. FLANAGAN, supra note 110, at 20.
114. Barwis, supra note 110, at 15, 17-18.
115. Negotiated Paid Leave for Educational Conferences, Conference Fees Paid, and Travel
Allowance Provisions, NEA NEGOTIATION RESEAR H DIGEST (Nov. 1973).
116. AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super. 249, 322 A.2d 846 (1974), affd, 136 N.J.
Super. 442, 346 A.2d 615 (1975).
117. Kansas Bd. of Regents v. Pittsburg State Univ. Chapter of Kan.-Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 233 Kan.
801, 667 P.2d 306 (1983).
118. Though judicial interpretation could legitimately accomplish this goal, see supra text accom-
panying note 19, statutory amendment is probably the most direct route. Adding a proviso to the
definition of good faith bargaining in § 8(d) and in analogous provisions in legislation governing the
public sector could elaborate this duty in the context of professional employment: Provided, that in
any unit composed primarily of professional employees 'conditions of employment' shall include any
subject either party raises.
An unsuccessful bill that proposed Federal legislation governing collective bargaining in the public
sector attempted to expand the scope of bargaining to include issues of policy. The bill would have
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would be easier for unions to bargain about and obtain agreements that
incorporate professional values, 9 particularly if professional employees
constitute the bargaining unit 20
1. The Increased Threat of Strikes
Some people who are otherwise sympathetic to an expanded scope of
mandatory bargaining for all employees nevertheless worry that it might
required bargaining over "the terms and conditions of employment and other matters of mutual
concern relating thereto." Labor-Management Relations in the Public Sector, 1973 and 1974:
Hearings on H.R. 8677 and H.R. 9730 Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm.
on Education and Labor, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1974) (emphasis added).
119. Some commentators suggest that the mandatory/permissive distinction can be circumvented
by skillful bargaining about permissive subjects and by mandatory bargaining over the effects of a
permissive decision. See J. GETMAN & B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS 123 (1988); Kohler, Dis-
tinctions Without Differences: Effects Bargaining in Light of First National Maintenance, 5 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 402 (1983). But one recent empirical study concludes that more time is spent bargaining
over mandatory than over permissive subjects and that mandatory status correlates with a narrower
gap between initial demands and eventual settlements. Delaney, Sockell & Brockner, Bargaining
Effects of the Mandatory-Permissive Distinction, 27 INDUS. RsL. 21, 31, 33 (1988). See also Wood-
bury, The Scope of Bargaining and Bargaining Outcomes in the Public Schools, 38 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 195, 208 (1985) (restrictions on bargaining over class size associated with larger student-
teacher ratios and higher teachers' salaries). These studies support the anecdotal evidence by partici-
pants in labor negotiations that it is harder to reach agreements over nonmandatory subjects. See
supra text accompanying note 75. Even if the distinction can be circumvented, moreover, ineffective-
ness is a poor basis for its retention. Note, supra note 101, at 1985.
120. In their comprehensive study of faculty bargaining in higher education, Professors Feller and
Finkin identify the composition of the bargaining unit as "the single most significant factor in adjust-
ing faculty collective bargaining to higher education." Feller & Finkin, supra note 70, at 80. Because
collective bargaining inevitably affects educational policy, they argue that "the polity for the selection
of the bargaining agent must be essentially coextensive with the polity in the system of academic
government." Id. at 97; see also id. at 140-41, 145, 160. According to Professor Feller, it is possible
to "avoid unnecessary antagonism between the adversary and the collegial systems, between collective
bargaining and academic self-governance, and between union and senate by establishing a collective-
bargaining agency whose constituency is identical with that of the senate." Feller, Alternative Organi-
zational Approaches, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN HIGHER EDUCATION 48, 50 (M. Abell ed.
1976).
Similarly, the American Bar Association and the Federal Bar Association have maintained that
lawyers should organize in their own units. In an informal opinion in 1967, the ABA Standing Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics found that lawyers "who are paid a salary and who are employed by a
single client employer" would not violate the Canons of Ethics by joining a union "limited solely to
other lawyer employees of the same employer." ABA Standing Comm. on Professional Ethics, Infor-
mal Op. 986 (1967). The introduction to a study by the Federal Bar Association stated that "attorneys
should be separated into units of attorneys alone so that non-attorneys should not be in a position to
determine courses of action for attorneys. This position is based upon the status of attorneys under
their Code of Ethics as relating to the attorney-client relationship and the status of attorneys as of-
ficers of the Court." Special Committee to Study Federal Employee Professional Associations, Sum-
mary of oral report by Committee Chairman Alan H. Randall, at the Federal Bar Association Na-
tional Council Meeting (May 15, 1973).
I recognize the relationship between units limited to professional employees and bargaining over
professional standards, but I am reluctant to require such units as a matter of law. The current rule
under the NLRA, which reflects a carefully considered congressional compromise, provides that the
NLRB shall not include professional and nonprofessional employees in the same unit unless a major-
ity of professional employees vote for a broader unit. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1) (1982); see Rabban,
supra note 1 (discussing legislative history of this provision). Given the appropriate emphasis on
employee choice in selecting a union and the longstanding tradition of "mixed" units of professionals
and nonprofessionals in various work settings, this rule should not be changed unless experience sug-
gests that unions representing "mixed" units disproportionately sacrifice professional values.
Professional Employee Bargaining
give workers too much power by strengthening their ability to strike.
Under the NLRA strikes over mandatory subjects are protected, whereas
strikes over permissive subjects are not.'21 In contrast, strikes by public
employees are illegal under any circumstances in most public sector juris-
dictions.'22 Requiring bargaining with professional employees on all sub-
jects would enable unions to use the pressure of a strike to destroy or
preclude professional values in those jurisdictions that protect strikes over
mandatory subjects.'
23
General concern about the relationship between the scope of bargaining
and the effectiveness of strikes has prompted consideration of ways to ex-
pand mandatory bargaining without a corresponding extension of the
right to strike. For example, one commentator on the NLRA suggests the
addition of a new category of "consultative subjects of bargaining" to the
current categories of mandatory, permissive, and illegal subjects. Unions
and employers would be required to "meet and confer" about consultative
subjects, but could not use economic weapons to pressure the other side to
agree to proposals about them.'24
This suggestion is unpersuasive. The principle that the threat of strikes
makes meaningful collective bargaining possible is fundamental to the sys-
tem established by the NLRA. This principle assumes that avoiding the
mutual economic damage of a strike is a major inducement for the parties
to compromise their differences at the bargaining table. Without the right
to strike, the right to negotiate has little significance.' 25 By uncoupling
mandatory negotiations from protected strikes, the creation of a new con-
sultative category would deviate from these basic premises of the NLRA
and would raise the danger of "collective begging," which already exists
121. Professors Feller and Finkin argue convincingly that in the private sector the distinction
between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining assumes more importance during strikes
than during the process of negotiations for which it was designed. See Feller & Finkin, supra note 70,
at 117-20.
122. See Developments, supra note 6, at 1701-04.
123. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing possible abolition of consultative bod-
ies of professionals if governance is mandatory subject).
Professor Kadish argues that strikes by professors over any subject may undermine five professional
values: "the service ideal; the moral basis of professional claims; the commitment to shared and co-
operative decision-making; the commitment to reason; and the pursuit of distinction." Kadish, The
Strike and the Professoriate, 54 A.A.U.P. BULL. 160, 163 (1968). Yet Kadish favors strikes by
professors in certain limited circumstances as, for example, where a university's "departure from aca-
demic freedom had previously been authenticated by a disinterested agency" or where "a faculty,
oppressed beyond endurance by low salaries and burdensome teaching loads, is reduced to striking as
a last ditch effort in self-defense and survival." Id. at 167.
124. Bellace, Mandatory Consultation: The Untravelled Road in American Labor Law, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH ANNUAL MEETING, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION
78, 82 (B. Dennis ed. 1987).
125. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-90 (1960), contains a strong
statement of this position, citing Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. Rxv. 1401,
1409 (1958). See also Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor Relations, 85 HARV. L.
REv. 459, 463-66 (1971) (possibility of strikes makes collective bargaining work).
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under the "meet and confer" provisions of various state laws covering
public employees.1"'
Especially in the context of professional employment, moreover, the un-
derlying concern about the danger of strikes seems overstated. The wide-
spread commitment to professional standards, whether derived from codes
of professional responsibility or otherwise internalized through training
and experience, makes professional employees less likely to strike, and
more likely to minimize the impact on clients when they do strike, than
other workers. Their strikes, in fact, are often designed to put pressure on
employers to implement, rather than to undermine, professional stan-
dards. For example, a news story about a strike by legal aid attorneys
reported that "the controversy centers on one issue: the quality of legal
representation given to poor people in this city."12 The union demands
included reduced case loads, better facilities for interviewing clients, addi-
tional time for legal research, and more continuity in legal
representation. 28
126. See supra text accompanying note 87. Although she does not explicitly oppose on theoretical
grounds the right to strike over a broader range of subjects, Professor Bellace apparently concludes
that concerns by others about extending the right to strike have led to unfortunate restrictions on the
scope of bargaining. See Bellace, supra note 124, at 80-82.
127. 400 Legal Aid Lawyers Go On Strikefor Better Pact, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1973, at 1, col. 1,
24, col. 1.
128. Id. at 1, col. 1. A subsequent discussion of attorneys' strikes in an opinion by the Committee
on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York expressed
concern about potential ethical violations. Yet the opinion also recognized claims that strikes had
broad professional purposes: "Legal Aid lawyers who have engaged in strike activities have contended
that the purpose of the strike is to protest large caseloads and other problems in the criminal justice
system and that a possible effect of their strike is to promote improvement of the legal system." N.Y.
City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. No. 82-75 at 7 (May 23, 1983)
(unpublished opinion; on file with author).
An informal opinion by the ABA concluded that strikes by lawyers may be consistent with the
ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility despite earlier opinions finding that a lawyer's mere mem-
bership in a union violates professional ethics. While acknowledging that some strike actions may
harm clients in ways prohibited by various disciplinary rules, the opinion observed that "in some
situations participation in a strike might be no more disruptive of the performance of legal work than
taking a two week's vacation might be." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Informal Op. 1325, at 3 (1975) ("Ethical Considerations in Strikes by Unions Representing Member-
ship Consisting Solely of Lawyers"). One study observes that staff attorneys threatening to strike a
legal services office were planning to help their clients unofficially. The attorneys cited their commit-
ment to their professional oath and their unwillingness "to let our clients down." E. SPANGLER,
LAWYERS FOR HIRE 154 (1986).
Nurses have expressed similar commitment to professional responsibility. Testifying about the pro-
posed extension of the NLRA to nonprofit hospitals, a representative of the American Nurses' Associ-
ation (ANA) emphasized the reluctance of nurses to strike.
Employees, especially professional employees such as registered nurses, do not resort to strikes
capriciously. Professional nurses strike only when they receive a rebuff from their employers to
their efforts to deal with professional concerns such as unmanageable patient care assignments,
copious clerical tasks, inadequate supportive services, [and] lack of equipment and supplies
which result in gross misutilization of our skills.
Hearings on S. 794 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1973) (statement of Bonnie P. Graczyk). In rescinding its no-strike
policy in 1968, the ANA advocated "concerted economic pressures which are lawful and consistent
with the nurse's professional responsibilities, and with the public's welfare." L. FLANAGAN, supra
note 110, at 15.
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It is also probable that people wary of any expanded right to strike
exaggerate the potential impact of strikes on employers and the public.
The widespread prohibition of strikes by public employees, many of
whom are professionals, has focused contemporary debate about the right
to strike on the public sector. Substantial, though controverted, evidence
indicates that the frequent and often ineffectively punished illegal strikes
in the public sector, which make a mockery of the laws against them, have
not caused major problems for employers or the public. Despite the warn-
ings of those who oppose extending the right to strike to public employees,
these illegal strikes have not generally placed greater pressure for settle-
ments and concessions on public than on private employers.' 9 Even the
more significant of these strikes cannot be isolated as determinative influ-
ences on public policy. They have constituted only one of many key fac-
tors in complex relationships involving politicians, community leaders, and
the general public, as well as employers and employees.1 30
In those relatively rare circumstances when strikes by professional em-
ployees do threaten the public welfare, existing laws offer models for reg-
ulation. For example, the NLRA allows injunctions against strikes that
"will imperil the national health or safety," '' and some public sector ju-
risdictions, despite the majority practice of issuing injunctions against any
illegal strike, provide injunctive relief only after proof that an illegal strike
presents substantial dangers to the public.'32 The 1974 amendments to the
NLRA require "employees of a health care institution," including profes-
sionals such as nurses and doctors, to give prior notification of any intent
The president of the Union of American Physicians and Dentists has distinguished between strikes
against patients and strikes against "the administrative apparatus" of "management entities." He
finds it "clearly reprehensible" for a physician to "leave any patient torn, bleeding, and unattended
just to further his own self-interest," and points out that in every country where physicians have
struck they also have made "ample provision for emergency or even urgent care." By contrast, strikes
against management are justifiable, even if they involve temporary "inconvenience" to patients by
deferring routine or elective procedures. Indeed, he sees "a total consonance of interest between doc-
tors and patients" in these circumstances because the "inconvenience would be compensated for in the
long term by our winning from our paymasters improvements in the standards of patient care." Mar-
cus, Trade Unionism for Doctors, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1508, 1510-11 (1984).
129. See Developments, supra note 6, at 1712-15. For a classic debate, compare the views of
Wellington and Winter opposing the right to strike in the public sector with the response by Burton
and Krider supporting it. See Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public
Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418 (1970); Wellington & Winter, Structuring Collective Bargaining in
Public Employment, 79 YALE L.J. 805, 822-52 (1970); Wellington & Winter, More on Strikes by
Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 441 (1970); Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargain-
ing in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107, 1123-27 (1969).
130. The strike by New York City school teachers in 1968 provides an excellent example. See,
e.g., M. MAYER, THE TEACHERS STRIKE: NEW YORK, 1968 15-16, 103-22 (1969) (teachers' strike
one factor among many in controversy over school decentralization; people in foundations, universities,
and Mayor's office more to blame for strike than any participants); D. RAVITCH, THE GREAT
SCHOOL WARS 312-98 (1974) (community control of schools, key issue in strike, soon lost importance
as major combatants dispersed and educational funding decreased).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 178(a)(ii) (1982).
132. H. EDWARDS, R. CLARK, & C. CRAVER, supra note 67, at 592 n.2. Most courts, however,
will issue injunctions against any illegal strikes by public employees without requiring additional
proof of potential impact or the employer's good faith. Id.
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to strike and preclude strikes for specified periods to enable attempts at
mediation and conciliation. 3 My proposal would allow strikes over any
subject by professional employees in both the private and public sectors,
subject to similar limiting provisions.
13 4
2. Legislating Minimum Standards
A legal system that allows strikes over an expanded range of mandatory
subjects can limit legislatively the substantive results the parties are free to
reach. Statutory enforcement of minimum standards could alleviate con-
cern that agreements between the parties might destroy professional values
and interfere with public interests. For example, statutes governing pri-
vate or public professional employment could demand adherence to stated
standards of quality, to codes of professional ethics, and to structures of
governance in organizations that employ professionals.
In fact, at least one jurisdiction has enacted such statutory provisions in
collective bargaining legislation covering public higher education. Califor-
nia law explicitly recognizes that "joint decision-making and consultation
between administration and faculty or academic employees is the long-
accepted manner of governing institutions of higher learning and is essen-
tial to the performance of the educational missions of these institu-
tions."' 3 5 While establishing mechanisms for faculty collective bargaining,
this legislation declares its intention "to both preserve and encourage...
shared governance mechanisms or practices . . . ."' It also requires the
parties to preserve academic freedom and peer review."'
Federal labor law does not provide analogous protections for profes-
sional values. Yet other Federal statutes and regulations governing specific
substantive programs illustrate legal standards to which collective bargain-
133. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(A)-(C) (1982).
134. Professors Knight and Sockell reach a similar conclusion. They advocate that the United
States follow Canadian law, which allows the parties to determine the scope of bargaining and ex-
tends the right to strike to all issues. Knight & Sockell, Public Policy and the Scope of Bargaining in
Canada and the United States, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FoRTY-FiRsT ANNUAL MEETING, INDUS-
TRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 279, 283, 285 (1988). Knight and Sockell concede that
there is a higher rate of strikes in Canada than in the United States, but they stress that among the
many explanations for this difference no analyst has cited the greater scope of bargaining in Canada.
135. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3561(b) (West Supp. 1989).
136. Id.
137. Id. §§ 3561(b)-(c). California law further provides that the scope of representation shall not
include "[pirocedures and policies to be used for the appointment, promotion, and tenure of members
of the academic senate," unless the academic senate itself determines that these matters "should be
within the scope of representation" or these matters are "withdrawn from the responsibility of the
academic senate .... Id. § 3562(q)(4). This provision favors preservation of traditional "collegial"
issues within the faculty senate, as the Carnegie Council recommends. See supra note 106. But unlike
the Carnegie Council approach, it provides a meaningful deterrent to possible administrative efforts to
undermine the role of the faculty senate. Administrators and trustees are less likely to disregard the
faculty senate when the alternative is dealing with the faculty union.
This California law seems well suited to universities with strong traditions of faculty governance,




ing agreements must conform. For example, legal services legislation re-
stricts litigation involving school desegregation and abortion, limits lobby-
ing by staff attorneys,1" and requires them to "refrain from the persistent
incitement of litigation and any other activity prohibited by the Canons of
Ethics and Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Asso-
ciation . ... ""' Medicare legislation imposes quality control and peer
review as a condition of payment to providers of services,"4 and uses ac-
creditation by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals as part
of its definition of a qualified hospital. " " It also establishes standards of
licensing, training, and services, and elaborates various residents' rights in
"skilled nursing facilit[ies]. ' ' "2 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has
issued regulations compelling its licensees to educate workers about the
health hazards of radiation and to inform them about their exposure to
it. " " And the Department of Health and Human Services has promul-
gated regulations that cover various aspects of research on human
subjects.
1 4 4
Presumably, any provisions in collective bargaining agreements deemed
inconsistent with legislation or administrative rules would be unenforce-
able. Such limitations on the substantive results of collective bargaining,
rather than restrictions on the scope of mandatory bargaining, are more
conducive to coordinating the right to bargain collectively with commit-
ment to professional values. 5
This recommendation does not respond fully to concerns that expanded
mandatory bargaining would preclude meaningful involvement and influ-
ence by professional employees who are not active in the union and by
potentially affected clients and citizens. 4 6 Yet I believe that modifying the
138. C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 943 & n.76 (1986).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(10) (1982).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1395g(b) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(w)(2) (1982).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb(a) (1982).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3 (West Supp. 1989).
143. 10 C.F.R. § 19.12-.13 (1989).
144. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.109, 46.116, 46.205 (1988) (roles of Institutional Review Boards; require-
ments for informed consent; additional duties of Institutional Review Boards when research involves
fetuses, pregnant women, or human in vitro fertilization).
145. Some subjects of bargaining have become topics for legal regulation. For example, unions of
interns and residents have negotiated for limitations on their working hours, citing dangers to patient
care as a key rationale. See Rabban, supra note 2, at 16; supra note 72. A highly publicized grand
jury investigation of the death of a patient while under the late-night care of interns and residents
prompted a commission of medical experts established by the New York State Health Commissioner
to limit most interns and residents to 24-hour shifts and 80-hour weeks. While some praise these new
regulations as likely to reduce fatigue and improve patient care, others criticize them as weakening
medical education and harming patient care. In Overhaul of Hospital Rules, New York Slashes In-
terns' Hours, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
146. Professors Wellington and Winter assert that professional employees tend to be "keenly
interested in the underlying philosophy that informs their work." H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER,
supra note 87, at 24. Yet bargaining by professional employees "over the noneconomic aspects of
political or policy issues" affects the nature of the service they perform. Id. at 92. Many of these
issues "are politically, socially, or ideologically sensitive." Id. at 23. Moreover, union positions on
these matters may reflect self-interest as well as opinions based on professional expertise. See id. at
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principles of exclusive representation and company domination addresses
these legitimate concerns without denying unions of professionals the right
to bargain over policy.1 47 Requiring collective bargaining, for example,
need not foreclose additional meetings on the same issues with other pro-
fessional employees as individuals or through committees, with clients who
use professional services, and with members of the general public.14 The
139. According to Wellington and Winter, at least in the public sector it is necessary to prevent
collective bargaining from excluding participation in resolving these issues either by members of the
community or by professional employees in the bargaining unit who dissent from the official union
bargaining positions. Id. at 92; see also Summers, supra note 57, at 1156, 1192-97 (concern that
collective bargaining in public sector may limit legitimate voice of ordinary citizens). Professor Freid-
son's warning that professionals may abuse their expertise by attempting to impose their own values
on clients, see supra note 102, applies in both the private and the public sectors.
147. Summers, supra note 57, at 1192-93, cites the danger to democratic decision-making as a
justification for restricting the scope of public sector bargaining. Because mandatory bargaining gives
public employees more power than other citizens, Professor Summers would restrict it to "subjects
that substantially implicate budgetary issues," over which the interests of public employees are gener-
ally opposed to the combined interests of taxpayers and users. In contrast, Summers argues that
neither public employees nor other citizens are likely to be unified on policy issues. Id. at 1193-95.
Summers stresses that this dramatic limitation on the subjects of bargaining should in no way be
understood to suggest that professional employees lack a legitimate interest in the resolution of non-
budgetary issues of policy. Indeed, Summers believes that the "special interests and competence" of
professional employees should prompt, and perhaps even require, public employers to consult with
them on these issues. Summers contends only "that the bargaining table is the wrong forum and the
collective agreement is the wrong instrument." Id. at 1195.
Limiting the scope of bargaining, Summers adds, also shelters professional autonomy over some
issues that should not become part of public debate.
Undoubtedly, there are decisions which should be left to professional judgment, but submitting
them to collective bargaining is a clumsy, inadequate, and even dangerous way of achieving
that. Bargaining is a political process responding to political forces and leaves teachers vulner-
able on some matters which should be beyond reach of local majorities.
Id. at 1194 n.72. Summers does not address the possibility that despite these risks, collective bargain-
ing may in certain circumstances be the most effective practical way to gain appropriate professional
power.
Professor Harper applies analogous reasoning to the private sector by suggesting a "product market
principle" to distinguish mandatory from permissive subjects of bargaining. "This principle," Harper
asserts, "would exclude from compulsory bargaining all decisions to determine what products are
created and sold, in what quantities, for which markets, and at what prices." Harper, Leveling the
Road from Borg-Warner to First National Maintenance: The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining, 68
VA. L. REv. 1447, 1463 (1982). Harper sees a direct analogy between his "product market principle"
in private employment and the concerns expressed by Wellington and Winter and by Summers in the
context of public employment. Just as "consumers should determine what goods and services private
employers will offer," Harper believes that "citizens voting in the polling booth should determine the
nature of goods and services that government will offer." Id. at 1500. "The standard for judging
whether a substantive bargaining proposal made by a public sector union is a mandatory bargaining
topic," Harper adds, "should be whether additional commitment of resources can satisfy the public's
demand without changing the nature of the public good or service." Id. at 1501.
As Harper notes, his "product market principle probably restricts the scope of bargaining for em-
ployees whose identities and behavior define the product more than for production employees or even
other service employees." Id. at 1467-68 n.81. Professionals are a major group of employees "whose
identities and behavior define the product." Yet Harper nowhere addresses the interests of profes-
sional employees in using collective bargaining to influence employer decisions about the nature of
professional services. As a result, he does not explore whether potentially competing interests of em-
ployers, consumers, and citizens might be accommodated without limiting the scope of bargaining.
Professor St. Antoine justly concludes that Harper's proposal "may unduly circumscribe bargaining
for a class of employees that will become increasingly significant in the post-industrial world," a class
that includes professional employees. St. Antoine, supra note 43, at 1316 n.68.
148. Professor Summers ciaims that legitimate professional interests in matters of policy can be
accommodated "without depriving any interested group of an opportunity to be heard." Examples of
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following Sections, after reviewing the background and interpretation of
these legal principles, propose such modifications.
IL EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATION
Section 9(a) of the NLRA requires that the union selected by the ma-
jority in an appropriate unit of employees shall be the exclusive bargain-
ing representative for all employees in the unit regarding wages, hours,
and other conditions of employment.149 The NLRB and the courts subse-
quently identified these terms as the mandatory subjects of bargaining.
After the selection of an exclusive representative, the legislative history of
the Wagner Act made clear, employers are precluded from bargaining
about these subjects with anyone else. 5 ° Exclusive representation, its pro-
ponents maintained, promotes worker solidarity that helps provide at least
the semblance of equality in bargaining power necessary for effective ne-
gotiations, meaningful agreements, and stable labor relations. 51
Advocates of exclusive representation added that it benefits employers
as well as employees.'1 2 They observed that workers who are divided
against themselves cannot approach an employer "in a spirit of good
will.' 153 Multiple or proportional representation, many argued, divides
the workers, promoting strife and chaos that impede the bargaining pro-
cess and decrease the probability of agreements. 5  They also claimed vir-
alternative procedures to collective bargaining include discussions with employers "wholly outside the
union framework" and participation in public meetings open to all citizens. Summers, supra note 57,
at 1195 n.73. Summers does not explain why these alternative procedures would not protect the inter-
ests of citizens if used in addition to collective bargaining rather than as a substitute for it.
Professors Wellington and Winter acknowledge the possibility of limiting the scope of bargaining,
but they also explore the option that additional procedures might be established to "preserve the
political process" while allowing mandatory bargaining by professionals over issues of policy. H.
WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 87, at 113. Among their suggestions are "multiparty bar-
gaining over subjects that relate to the nature of the services the employees provide," id. at 150-51,
public hearings during the course of negotiations between the exclusive representative and the em-
ployer, id. at 151, intervention by third parties or a referendum upon petition by citizens, id. at 152,
and "strict monitoring of the scope of bargaining by governmental commissions." Id.
149. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
150. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 13, reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF TIE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr, 1935, at 2300, 2312-13 (1935) [hereinafter
LEG. HIsT. NLRA]; Memorandum comparing S. 2926 (73d Cong.) and S. 1958 (74th Cong.) Senate
Comm. Print, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1935), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. NLRA, supra, at 1319,
1355; 79 CONG. REC. 7571 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST. NLRA,
supra, at 2321, 2336.
151. See, e.g., 79 CONG. REc. 2337-38 (1935) (statement of Rep. Boland), reprinted in 2 LEG.
Hisr. NLRA, supra note 150, at 2430, 2441-44; 79 CONG. REC. 3184 (1935) (address by Francis
Biddle, Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIsT. NLRA, supra
note 150, at 1314, 1318.
152. See, e.g., 79 CONG. REc. 7571 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEG.
HIST. NLRA, supra note 150, at 2321, 2336; S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1935),
reprinted in 2 LEG. HIsT. NLRA, supra note 150, at 2300, 2313.
153. 79 CONG. REc. 2337 (1935) (statement of Rep. Boland), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST. NLRA,
supra note 150, at 2430, 2441-42.
154. See, e.g., id.; National Labor Relations Board, Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Edu-
cation and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 (1935) (statement of Lloyd K. Garrison, Dean of Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Law School), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. NLRA, supra note 150, at 1505, 1507;
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tually universal recognition of the practical difficulties in applying more
than one agreement to the same unit of workers or a single agreement to
only a portion of those workers.1 5'
A. The Implications of Exclusive Representation for Collegial
Governance
Neither the NLRB nor the courts has focused on the implications of
exclusive representation for professional values. Yet the NLRB has ac-
knowledged that exclusive representation does threaten collegial systems of
professional governance. It noted in a faculty representation proceeding
that the election of an exclusive union representative could jeopardize the
viability, and even the validity, of collegial faculty bodies.15 But the
NLRB never pursued this crucial observation. When a group of faculty
members in a subsequent case wrote a letter asking the NLRB how the
election of a faculty union would affect the current "'collegial system with
its shared governance arrangements,' " the majority replied that any dis-




One member of the NLRB, however, dissented from this response. He
pointed out that the election of a union would inevitably jeopardize the
influence of non-union bodies over mandatory subjects of bargaining. The
union's impact on these structures, he quickly added, could not be pre-
dicted before the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement. While
some unions might insist on their statutory right to exclusive representa-
tion regarding mandatory subjects, others might want existing collegial
bodies to continue dealing with at least some of these subjects.1 8
Faculty cases in the public sector illustrate the impact exclusive repre-
sentation can have on collegial governance.1 59 Because a teaching effective-
Memorandum Comparing S. 2926 (73d Cong.) and S. 1958 (74th Cong.) Senate Comm. Print, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1935), reprinted in I LEG. HisT. NLRA, supra note 150, at 1319, 1355.
155. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEG.
HisT. NLRA, supra note 150, at 2910, 2928-29; 79 CONG. REC. 7672 (1935) (statement of Sen.
Walsh), reprinted in 2 LEG. HisT. NLRA, supra note 150, at 2321, 2390; id. at 7571 (statement of
Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST. NLRA, supra note 150, at 2321, 2336; S. REP. No. 573,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIsT. NLRA, supra note 150, at 2300, 2313;
National Labor Relations Board, Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1935) (statement of Lloyd K. Garrison), reprinted in 1 LEG. HisT. NLRA,
supra note 150, at 1505, 1506.
156. Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 648 n.31 (1972).
157. Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247, 249 (1975) (quoting faculty letter to NLRB).
158. Id. at 256-57 (board member Kennedy, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159. The facts of Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271
(1984), see supra text accompanying notes 88-100, reveal that the "meet and confer" committees
controlled by the exclusive union representative replaced whatever faculty senates previously existed in
the Minnesota community college system. 465 U.S. at 275-76. Knight thus illustrates the impact
collective bargaining in a system of exclusive representation can have on collegial governance.
Yet the Court's reasoning in Knight is not based on the principle of exclusive representation. The
statute construed in Knight expressly distinguished between "meet and negotiate" sessions, the setting
for traditional collective bargaining over mandatory subjects, and "meet and confer" sessions, the set-
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ness program developed by the faculty senate affected the retention, pro-
motion, and tenure of professors, the Supreme Court of Michigan held
that it involved a mandatory subject of bargaining. By unilaterally adopt-
ing the senate's recommendations, the court concluded, the university had
violated its duty to bargain with the exclusive union representative. At the
same time, the court indicated that this duty did not preclude the faculty
senate from considering and making recommendations about mandatory
subjects. The court only required "the limited obligation to bargain
before unilateral imposition of new criteria" and emphasized that the
university, after bargaining in good faith with the union, could ultimately
adopt the recommendation of the faculty senate.16 °
Another decision by a state supreme court highlighted the connections
between exclusive representation, collegial governance, and the scope of
bargaining. Emphasizing that "the purposes of exclusive representation
are sometimes inapplicable in a university faculty setting," the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire held that exclusive representation did not pre-
clude the continuation of faculty advisory committees on matters such as
curriculum and research. The court wanted to preserve "some play in the
joints rather than to constrict or destroy campus life" in construing the
state's statute governing collective bargaining by public employees."' It
nevertheless indicated that faculty committees dealing with wages, hours,
and other conditions of employment did "impinge on exclusive union rep-
resentation" and could be abolished after a union election.'" At the same
time, the court recognized that it could not offer a "bright line distinction"
between these two categories of committees.' 63
ting for exchanges of views on nonmandatory subjects. The requirement of bargaining in good faith
with the exclusive representative applied only to the "meet and negotiate" sessions. Id. at 273-74.
Of course, the principle of exclusive representation regarding mandatory subjects of bargaining
undoubtedly influenced the legislature's decision allowing the union to designate the employee repre-
sentatives in the "meet and confer" sessions. "If it is rational for the State to give the exclusive
representative a unique role in the 'meet and negotiate' process," the majority observed, "it is rational
for the State to do the same in the 'meet and confer' process." Id. at 291. Yet the state justification
with respect to the "meet and confer" process is not protecting the union in its role as exclusive
representative, which applies to the "meet and negotiate" process and has been recognized as suffi-
ciently "compelling" to trump competing First Amendment interests, but its "rational" and "legiti-
mate interest in ensuring that its public employers hear one, and only one, voice presenting the major-
ity view of its professional employees on employment-related policy questions . I..." d
160. Central Mich. Univ. Faculty Ass'n v. Central Mich. Univ., 404 Mich. 268, 283, 273
N.W.2d 21, 27 (1978) (quoting Central Mich. Univ. Faculty Ass'n v. Central Mich. Univ., 75 Mich.
App. 101, 114, 254 N.W.2d 802, 808 (1978) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting)).
161. Keene State Educ. Ass'n, 120 N.H. 32, 37, 411 A.2d 156, 160 (1980).
162. Id.
163. Id; see also id. at 34, 411 A.2d at 158 (citing order of state Public Employee Labor Rela-
tions Board that "except for those committees dealing with wages, hours and conditions of employ-
ment, the faculty should be restored to a status equal to that of faculty at other campuses in the
system").
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B. The Range of Permissible Nonunion Contacts Between Employers
and Employees
The principle of exclusive representation, despite its potential limita-
tions on collegial governance, does not preclude all contacts about
mandatory subjects between employers and employees outside the union
framework. Legislative history, reinforced by judicial interpretation,
makes clear that exclusive representation does not prevent employees from
presenting grievances to employers on their own. Under some circum-
stances, moreover, employees can raise topics with their employers that
are broader than grievances and could be subjects of bargaining, yet not
engage in bargaining because of the limited nature of the discussions. The
point at which permissible contacts become unfair labor practices remains
unclear. Cases that reveal this largely unexplored territory between the
presentation of grievances and collective bargaining arose primarily in the
industrial sector. Yet they speak directly to the strong interest many pro-
fessional employees have in offering their independent views on profes-
sional issues whether or not they have elected an exclusive union
representative.
1. The Distinction Between Collective Bargaining and the Presenta-
tion of Grievances
During the debates over the Wagner Act, many employers opposed ex-
clusive representation in any form. Yet a significant number of employers,
without directly attacking exclusive representation itself, complained that
section 9(a) unnecessarily restrained desirable contact between employers
and employees free from union intervention. Proponents of section 9(a)
responded by stressing the protection for minority rights in the original
proviso to this provision, which declared that "any individual employee or
group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances
to their employer through representatives of their own choosing."1 4
Employers were not reassured by this proviso. They observed that the
central thrust of section 9(a) gives the majority representative the exclu-
sive right to represent all employees in a unit "for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment." 165 Another employer assumed that by
164. S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1935), reprinted in 1 LEG. HisT. NLRA, supra note 150,
at 1295, 1300; see also 79 CONG. Rac. 7571 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEG.
HiST. NLRA, supra note 150, at 2321, 2337; S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1935),
reprinted in 2 LEG. HiST. NLRA, supra note 150, at 2300, 2313; Memorandum Comparing S. 2926
(73d Cong.) and S. 1958 (74th Cong.) Senate Comm. Print, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1935), re-
printed in 1 LEG. HisT. NLRA, supra note 150, at 1319, 1355.
165. National Labor Relations Board, Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Education and
Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 635 (1935) (statement of Harvey J. Kelly, representing American News-
paper Publishers Association; Kelly was also Chairman of the Industrial Board), reprinted in 2 LEG.
HisT. NLRA, supra note 150, at 2018, 2021.
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the terms of the proviso grievances "of a more or less minor character
could be brought up by the minority, but the principal and basic condi-
tions affecting the relationship of employer and employee could only be
discussed through representatives of the majority."""
Despite this employer concern, Congress decided that even the proposed
proviso unduly jeopardized the principle of exclusive representation. In a
lengthy discussion with William Green, the President of the American
Federation of Labor (AFL), William Connery, the Chairman of the
House Committee on Labor, explained that he was "somewhat leery" that
the proviso would allow employers to settle grievances brought by minor-
ity groups on more generous terms than grievances brought by the exclu-
sive representative. Such favoritism, Connery feared, would undermine
the exclusive representative and encourage the very company unionism
prohibited by other NLRA provisions. Connery suggested an additional
proviso to section 9(a) mandating that any grievance presented to an em-
ployer must be settled between the employer and the exclusive
representative.
1 67
Congress responded to these concerns, but not by adopting Connery's
suggested additional proviso. Instead, Congress simply amended the origi-
nal proviso by deleting the phrase "through representatives of their own
choosing," language to which Green objected, 6 ' and by inserting "a" to
modify "group." ' The legislative history does not comment specifically
on this deletion, but it was clearly designed to preclude the presentation of
grievances by a minority union. The more subtle addition of "a" seems to
reinforce this deletion by hinting that while a group of employees may
present grievances, this group must be an ad hoc assembly rather than a
continuing organization.
In the years following the Wagner Act, the NLRB interpreted the pro-
viso to section 9(a) as if the additional proviso proposed by Connery in
1935 had actually become the law. The Board concluded that the enacted
proviso, while allowing the presentation of grievances by an individual or
166. Id. at 795 (statement submitted by Muskegon Employers Association), reprinted in 2 LEG.
HIST. NLRA, supra note 150, at 2179, 2181.
167. Labor Disputes Act: Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the House Comm. on Labor, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 210-11 (1935) (statements of Rep. Connery), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIsT. NLRA,
supra note 150, at 2671, 2684-85.
168. Green consistently reiterated the right of individual employees to bring grievances on their
own and never responded directly to the additional proviso suggested by Connery. But Green did
agree that the original proviso should be amended, and indicated that it raised the specters of multiple
bargaining and company unionism. Green focused his objections on the language of the proviso al-
lowing a group of employees to present grievances "through representatives of their own choosing,"
terminology he found "confusing and misleading." Id. at 211-12, 223 (statements of William Green,
President, American Federation of Labor), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIsT. NLRA, supra note 150, at
2671, 2685-86, 2285, 2697.
169. The changed proviso read: "Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employ-
ees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer [through representatives of
their own choosing]." S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIsr. NLRA,
supra note 150, at 2285, 2291.
1990]
The Yale Law Journal
a group of employees, gave the exclusive representative the right to take
over and settle those grievances with the employer. During the considera-
tion of the Taft-Hartley Amendments in 1947, the House rejected this
"strange construction" 170 of the original proviso and proposed additional
language stating that grievances could be settled as well as presented
"without the intervention of the bargaining representative if the settlement
is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement
then in effect."17' According to the House Report, this additional lan-
guage restored the proper meaning to the original proviso.
1 72
Opponents of this additional language, reiterating Connery's earlier
concerns, complained that it would allow employers to undermine the ex-
clusive representative by practicing favoritism in settling grievances.173 In-
deed, one Congressman pointed out that a number of labor relations con-
sultants had successfully advised employers in the textile industry to
destroy unions in precisely this way.17 4 Apparently in response to this
danger, the Senate added a second proviso allowing the bargaining repre-
sentative to be present at any adjustment of a grievance.'
It is striking that throughout the debate over changes in section 9(a) no
one suggested that employees should have the option of presenting or ad-
justing grievances "through representatives of their own choosing," the
170. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIsT. LMRA,
supra note 30, at 292, 325.
171. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. LMRA, supra note
30, at 158, 185.
172. Id.; H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. LMRA,
supra note 30, at 292, 325.
173. H. Min. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIsT. LMRA,
supra note 30, at 355, 376.
174. 93 CONG. REC. H.3702 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1947), reprinted in 1 LEG. HiST. LMRA, supra
note 30, at 769, 781 (statement of Cong. Lanham). The House rejected the proposed deletion of this
additional language. 93 CONG. REC. H.3702 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1947), reprinted in I LEG. HIST.
LMRA, supra note 30, at 769, 782.
175. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEG. HisT. LMRA, supra note
30, at 226, 244; S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEG. HisT. LMRA,
supra note 30, at 407, 430. Some members of Congress remained unsatisfied. They argued that the
mere presence of the union at the adjustment of grievances, without any opportunity to be present
during preliminary discussions or to participate more actively in the final adjustment, did not suffi-
ciently prevent the employer from "dealing directly" and "giving favored treatment" to nonunion
employees. 93 CONG. REC. S.6663 (daily ed. June 6, 1947), reprinted in 2 LEG. HisT. LMRA,
supra note 30, at 1575, 1581 (analysis submitted by Sen. Murray). Nevertheless, Congress included
with only minor changes in wording both the new House language and the additional Senate proviso
in the Taft-Hartley Amendments.
As amended by Taft-Hartley, § 9(a) reads as follows:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority
of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives
of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any
individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present griev-
ances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the
bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a
collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the bargain-
ing representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
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phrase deleted by the Wagner Act from the first version of this proviso.
Both supporters and opponents of the additional language in the Taft-
Hartley Amendments apparently assumed that the expanded rights to
present and adjust grievances independently of the exclusive representative
did not include resort to minority unions.
Some case law since the Taft-Hartley Amendments has addressed the
difference between bargaining and the presentation of grievances under
the provisos to section 9(a). According to the few cases dealing with this
crucial subject, the limitation of the provisos to grievances demonstrates
that Congress intended to distinguish them from bargaining. Grievances
are typically defined as comparatively minor concerns affecting an individ-
ual or a subgroup of employees within a unit. Bargaining, by contrast,
concerns major issues of policy involving the entire unit. Any broader defi-
nition of grievances, cases warn, could encourage "a sort of continuous
'collective-bargaining,' under the guise of presenting grievances," ' 6 thus
obliterating the significance of exclusive representation that is so crucial to
the NLRA's basic structure.1 7 7 Virtually all cases stated or assumed that a
minority labor organization is precluded not only from bargaining, but
also from presenting grievances under section 9(a) .
7 8
This limited freedom to present grievances without union intervention
provides scant reassurance to those worried that the election of a union
could transform discussions of professional issues between employers and
employees into violations of the principle of exclusive representation. Most
of these issues could not fall under the relatively narrow category of griev-
ances. For example, discussions about curriculum in schools and universi-
ties, standards of nursing and medical practice in hospitals, staffing pat-
terns and budgets in legal services programs, and repertoire in symphony
orchestras would all involve major issues of policy rather than minor con-
cerns of a few individuals. To the extent that professional issues become
mandatory subjects of bargaining, the protection of individual rights in the
provisos to section 9(a) does not mitigate the threat posed by exclusive
representation to independent contacts between employers and employees.
2. Discussions of Mandatory Subjects Without Collective Bargaining
An intriguing, limited, and ambiguous body of case law indicates that
some discussion of mandatory subjects between employers and employees
176. NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 349 F.2d 1, 5 (9th Cir. 1965).
177. West Tex. Util. Co. v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 442, 447-48 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 855 (1953).
178. The major exception was Douds v. Local 1250, Retail Wholesale Dep't Store Union, 173
F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1949). Learned Hand wrote the opinion in Douds, but his eminence did not
prompt other judges to follow his reasoning. For criticism of Douds, see Report of Committee on
Improvement of Administration of Union-Management Agreements, 50 Nw. U.L. REV. 143, 184-88
(1955); Note, Collective Bargaining, Grievance Adjustment, and the Rival Union, 17 U. CHI. L.
REv. 533 (1950).
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does not constitute collective bargaining and therefore does not violate the
principle of exclusive representation. Yet these cases have only the most
modest potential for promoting meaningful communication about profes-
sional issues without union involvement.
Decisions uniformly assert that the employer cannot bypass the exclu-
sive union representative by negotiating with individual employees or
groups of employees within the bargaining unit. But an employer can
gather employee views about mandatory subjects of negotiation to develop
its own bargaining position with the union rather than to influence the
employees."' 9 A moderate amount of "back and forth" discussions between
an employer and a group of employees over wages suggested by the em-
ployees did not violate exclusive representation when the employer simul-
taneously bargained in good faith with the union"o And the NLRB re-
jected charges that an employer committed an unfair labor practice by
allowing two employees who had asked questions about a proposed health
and welfare plan to meet with a representative of the insurance company
offering the plan. Nor did the Board criticize the employer for subse-
quently asking one of the employees to give his reaction to the presenta-
tion. '8 Even in condemning a company "Speak Out" program for inter-
fering with the negotiated grievance procedure, a court made clear that
the program would not violate the NLRA if it were limited to "informa-
tional" matters. While the court did not specify what would constitute
information rather than grievances, it indicated that defending company
policy, announcing referrals of complaints to company officials for further
investigation, and suggesting that a topic be addressed to the union as a
possible subject for future collective bargaining would all be
permissible.1 "2
A case that reached the Supreme Court in the mid-1970's presented an
excellent opportunity to map out the permissible realm of extra-union in-
teraction between employers and employees. Unfortunately, the Court
barely pursued this opportunity. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Ad-
dition Community Organization arose from employees' claims that their
employer had engaged in racial discrimination when making assignments
and promotions. Some employees, asserting that the contractual grievance
procedure was not an adequate tool to deal with the systemic discrimina-
tion they attributed to the employer, demanded a meeting with the presi-
dent of the company.18 When the president refused to meet with them, a
few of these employees picketed the store and distributed handbills urging
179. Continental Oil Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 126, 131-32 (1971).
180. American Printing Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 73, 75-76 (1968).
181. Tobasco Prestressed Concrete Co., 177 N.L.R.B. 745, 748-49, 750 (1969), enforced sub
nom., NLRB v. Newport Concrete Co., 430 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1970).
182. United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 536 F.2d 550, 559 (3d Cir. 1976).




customers to boycott it because the employer was "a 20th Century colonial
plantation" and a "racist pig."' ' After unsuccessfully urging the picketers
to cease and to rely instead on the contractual grievance procedure, the
company fired them. 815
The NLRB, affirming the findings and conclusions of the Trial Exam-
iner, characterized the efforts of the employees to deal with the president
as attempted bargaining that would have interfered with the rights and
responsibilities of the exclusive union representative. The judges on the
court of appeals and the Justices on the Supreme Court, though differing
about whether the employer could fire the picketing employees, all agreed
that these employees were not simply presenting a group grievance under
section 9(a). Rather, the dissidents, acting on behalf of all employees,
wanted broad changes in management policies regarding minorities and
tried to circumvent the grievance procedure and the union by negotiating
directly with the company president. 86
The Supreme Court acknowledged that it did not know "precisely what
form the demands advanced" by the employees would take.187 Yet, as
Judge Wyzanski pointed out in his Second Circuit opinion, any positive
response by the employer would be "a political victory" for the employees
and would inevitably weaken the appeal of the existing union and its
leadership. Wyzanski also observed that certain employer responses could
result in changes in policy that might favor minorities at the expense of
the many white employees the union had a duty to represent. 88 The Su-
preme Court elevated this possibility into a certainty by assuming that the
demands of the dissident employees would include transfers of minority
employees into more remunerative positions, which would violate the col-
lective bargaining agreement.189
The lessons of Emporium Capwell are difficult to intuit. The broad
goals of the employees, even if they had been connected more directly with
their personal experiences, do support the conclusion that they were not
simply bringing a group grievance under section 9(a). Bargaining, how-
ever, involves the activities of at least two parties. There was no evidence
that the president, had he responded to the employees' demand, would
have violated the company's duty to the exclusive union representative.
The president might simply have given the employees the same answer
they ultimately received from the Supreme Court: Any alteration in job
assignments must be negotiated between the employer and the union. Al-
184. Id. at 55-56 n.2.
185. Id. at 55-56.
186. Western Addition Community Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917, 929 & n.34 (majority), 937
(dissent) (1973), revd sub nom. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420
U.S. 50 (1975); 420 U.S. at 60-61 (majority), 75-76 (dissent).
187. Emporium Capwell Co., 420 U.S. at 68.
188. Western Addition Community Org., 485 F.2d at 937 (Wyzanski, J., dissenting).
189. Emporium Capweil Co., 420 U.S. at 68.
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ternatively, the president might have tried to convince the employees that
the company had not engaged in systemic discrimination. Such responses,
as other cases have indicated, 90 do not constitute bargaining. 91
Even if the president had attempted to correct the problems the employ-
ees raised, he could have done so without interfering with the union's role
as exclusive representative. After all, the collective bargaining agreement
itself prohibited employment discrimination. The employer might have
been able to respond to the employees' "demands" under the agree-
ment. 92 Perhaps the Court, without explicitly so stating, concluded that
the totality of the employees' conduct-including their rejection of the
contractual grievance procedure, their refusal to deal with any employer
representative other than the president, and their insistence on picketing
and distributing inflammatory handbills-revealed an attempt to circum-
vent the exclusive representative and to engage in collective bargaining.
A Supreme Court decision the following year, involving collective bar-
gaining by professional employees in the public sector, further confused
the distinction between permissible discussion about mandatory subjects
and violations of the principle of exclusive representation. In City of
Madison Joint School District No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission,'93 the Court refused to find a violation of exclusive represen-
tation under state law in circumstances that seemed to fit within a mean-
ingful conception of attempted bargaining much more closely than the ac-
tivities prohibited in Emporium Capwell. The school board in City of
Madison reserved a portion of its open meetings for the expression of
public opinion. During this period, the president of the local teachers'
union urged resolution of the impasse in the ongoing collective bargaining
negotiations between the union and the school board and presented a sup-
porting petition signed by teachers in the bargaining unit.1 94
190. See supra text accompanying notes 179-82.
191. Indeed, the Trial Examiner, whose findings on this issue the NLRB and the courts affirmed,
pointed out that the company was prepared to allow "informal discussion" between the dissident
employees and its personnel director. Yet the employees "scorned such talks and insisted on negotiat-
ing directly with" the president. The Trial Examiner thus implied that an "informal discussion"
between employees and their employer about alleged employment discrimination would not violate the
principle of exclusive representation as long as no actual bargaining occurred. The Emporium, 192
N.L.R.B. 173, 185-86 (1971), rev'd sub nom. Western Addition Community Org. v. NLRB, 485
F.2d 917 (1973), rev'd sub nom. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420
U.S. 50 (1975) (affirming NLRB decision).
192. The dissenting member of the NLRB essentially made this point. He emphasized that the
employees had not sought "discussions leading to agreements on new conditions of employment, or
even a modification of existing ones, or even to effect a compromise of the grievances." They only
wanted "a simple conference to call attention to their situation" and "to urge upon the president to
use his good offices to see to it that the alleged discriminatory treatment of the minority employees,"
which was prohibited by the collective bargaining agreement, would be ended. Even if the president
had met the employees and had undertaken to correct the problems they raised, the dissenter insisted,
he would not in any way have interfered with the union's role as exclusive representative. Id. at 179
(Brown, dissenting).
193. 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
194. Id. at 171.
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The next speaker the board recognized was a teacher who had been
opposing the union proposal to include a "fair share" provision in the
contract. This provision would have required teachers who were not
members of the union to pay full union dues in order to help cover the
costs of collective bargaining that benefited all teachers. 95 The speaker
announced that he represented an informal committee of teachers and
read a petition urging deferral of the fair share proposal. The only re-
sponse by any member of the school board was the president's inquiry
into whether the teacher intended to submit the petition to the board. The
entire presentation took approximately two and one-half minutes."'
After this public meeting, the board met in executive session and de-
cided to agree to all of the union's demands except the fair share provi-
sion. The union accepted this proposal in a negotiating session the next
morning and ultimately signed a collective bargaining agreement. But the
union also filed a complaint alleging that the school board had violated the
exclusivity principle in the state labor act by allowing the dissident
teacher to speak during its public meeting.
19 7
The Supreme Court ultimately decided City of Madison on First
Amendment grounds, 98 but it addressed in passing whether the dissident
teacher and the school board had engaged in prohibited collective bargain-
ing. "  The Court characterized as "cryptic" the conclusion by the state
courts that under state law the teacher's interaction with the board consti-
tuted "negotiating." Observing that "calling a thing by a name does not
make it so," the Court pointed out that the teacher was not authorized to
negotiate an agreement with the school board and did not attempt to do
so.200 The actual bargaining, the Court stated, had been conducted in pri-
vate between the union and the school board.2"' Justice Stewart confi-
dently added in his concurrence that exclusivity is not threatened when a
member of the bargaining unit simply expresses his views on a subject of
collective bargaining at a public meeting.20 2
As the state courts convincingly observed, however, the teacher's state-
ment at the school board meeting did not simply express an opinion by an
individual citizen. Rather, it culminated an effort by an organized minor-
ity within the bargaining unit to convince the employer to reject a provi-
sion proposed by the exclusive union representative. The teacher described
himself as the representative of this minority and presented a petition on
195. Id. at 169.
196. Id. at 171-72.
197. Id. at 172.
198. See infra text accompanying notes 206-08.
199. As the Court noted, the definition of "negotiation" under state law, which would not nor-
mally be a matter for its review, became relevant because the state relied on this definition "as a
predicate for restraining speech." 429 U.S. at 174 n.5.
200. Id. at 174.
201. Id. at 174 n.6.
202. Id. at 180 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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its behalf despite requests by the union not to address the board at a par-
ticularly delicate stage of the negotiating process.2 03 This context resem-
bles collective bargaining much more closely than the facts of the Empo-
rium Capwell case, where the Supreme Court found that the employees
had attempted to bargain.
Even the broader range of permissible interaction suggested by City of
Madison, however, allows little optimism for those concerned about the
impact of unionization on professional values. The teacher's presentation
to the board was brief, and the board's response consisted only of one
procedural question from its president. Courts are likely to find that fre-
quent and detailed contacts between employers and professional employees
about mandatory bargaining subjects violate the principle of exclusive
representation.
3. Experience in the Public Sector
State statutes and the First Amendment place limits on the principle of
exclusive representation in the public sector. As a result, public employees
in both union and non-union settings have more access to employers than
their private counterparts, who are governed by the NLRA. Interactions
between employees and private employers that would violate section 9(a)
may be required in public employment. Public sector experience suggests
ways to modify exclusive representation in both private and public profes-
sional employment.
In many states, often because of explicit legislation, public employers
must hold open meetings before ratifying collective bargaining agreements.
At the same time, states frequently exempt from this requirement the col-
lective bargaining sessions between the exclusive union representative and
the public employer, thereby allowing the parties to work out a tentative
agreement without the glare of publicity.2 '" These statutes protect the
principle of exclusive representation while allowing citizens who are not
parties to negotiations, including public employees represented by a union,
to comment on proposed provisions in collective bargaining agreements
that affect the public interest.
Although most laws do not specify when a public meeting must take
place, some are more precise. Laws in Wisconsin and California, for ex-
203. City of Madison, Joint School District No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n,
69 Wis.2d 200, 204-07, 214-15, 231 N.W.2d. 206, 209-10, 213-14 (1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 167
(1976). According to the union, the dissident teacher spoke "as a representative and collective bargain-
ing agent for a dissident minority in the bargaining unit and not in the capacity as an individual
citizen." Brief of Madison Teachers Inc., Appellee, at 13, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (No. 75-946).
204. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAw ANN. ch. 39 § 23(B)(3) (West 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
91-A:2(I)(b) (1988 Supp.); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.660(2) (1987); cf. Talbot v. Concord Union School
Dist., 114 N.H. 532, 534-36, 323 A.2d 912, 913-14 (1974) (negotiating sessions between school
board and teachers' union outside ambit of state right-to-know law, but board approval of recommen-
dations made during negotiations must be presented at open meeting).
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ample, provide that all initial bargaining proposals must be presented at a
public meeting. The California Educational Employment Relations Act
goes further. It requires the school employer, before closed bargaining ses-
sions begin, to hold a meeting at which the public can express views on
these proposals. Any new subject of bargaining advanced during negotia-
tions, moreover, must be made public within twenty-four hours.'0 5
City of Madison best illustrates how applying the First Amendment to
open meetings provides additional rights to public employees. Reversing
the state courts, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the First
Amendment precludes restricting the speech of the dissident teacher,
whether or not his statement could be construed as "negotiating."2 °8 The
Court noted that a school board could constitutionally limit the agenda of
a public meeting and hold private sessions to transact business.207 It
stressed, however, that "when the board sits in public meetings to conduct
public business and hear the views of citizens, it may not be required to
discriminate between speakers on the basis of their employment, or the
content of their speech."' 08 Highlighting the relationship between exclu-
sive representation and the scope of bargaining, the Court emphasized
that "there is virtually no subject concerning the operation of the school
system that could not also be characterized as a potential subject of collec-
tive bargaining."209 The Court's holding, while limiting the power of the
union in public meetings where bargaining subjects are discussed, pre-
served the fundamental advantages of exclusive representation. Of greatest
importance, it did not grant any other person access to the private bar-
gaining sessions between the union and the employer.210
C. Suggested Modifications of Exclusive Representation in Professional
Employment
Experience in the public sector demonstrates that the essentials of ex-
clusive representation can be maintained while broadening access to the
employer by members of the public, including employees who may not
support official union positions. Respect for democratic decision-making
about matters of public policy and First Amendment principles lie behind
the limitations on exclusive representation in public employment. The
value of professional expertise and judgment to organizational decision-
making suggests similar results for professional employees in both the pri-
vate and public sectors. Collective bargaining, which professionals often
205. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 3547 (West 1980); see also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4)(cm)(2)
(West 1988).
206. 429 U.S. at 173-74.
207. Id. at 175 n.8.
208. Id. at 176.
209. Id. at 177.
210. The concurring opinions of Justice Brennan, id. at 177-79, and Justice Stewart, id. at 180,
emphasized this point, which the majority recognized as well, id. at 174 n.6 & 175 n.8.
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pursue to gain the influence to which they feel entitled,2" should not pre-
clude individual and collegial interaction that serves the same purpose.
Professional employees should receive greater access to their employers
than required by existing incursions on the principle of exclusive repre-
sentation in the public sector. The public sector cases assert that if the
public employer holds a public meeting on its own initiative or as man-
dated by a statute, then all citizens, including employees, have a right to
discuss matters on the agenda. These cases also indicate that at least some
interchange between the employer and employees at these meetings does
not constitute bargaining. Yet the First Amendment does not require the
employer to establish a public forum, as the Supreme Court majority em-
phasized in denying faculty members access to the "meet and confer" ses-
sions between the Minnesota community college system and the exclusive
union representative. 12 The legitimate professional roles in organizational
decision-making should entitle either the employer or the employees to
initiate and maintain contacts through individuals, groups, or standing
committees about matters of professional concern, whether or not the
elected union representative agrees. Such contacts should be permissible as
long as the employer does not use them to avoid bargaining in good faith
and negotiating an agreement with the elected exclusive representative. 1 '
1. Similarities to Original Understandings of Exclu-
sive Representation
This proposal closely resembles the understanding about the original
draft of section 9(a) in the Wagner bill that emerged in a revealing in-
terchange among Walter Gordon Merritt, who represented a large na-
tional employers' association called the League for Industrial Rights; Sen-
ator Walsh, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Education and
Labor; and Calvert Magruder, the chief counsel of the first NLRB. Mer-
ritt conceded that the terms of a collective bargaining agreement must be
211. See supra notes 21, 102, 110 and accompanying text.
212. Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 280-81 (1984); see
supra text accompanying notes 97-100 (rejection of faculty First Amendment claims). The Court
explicitly distinguished City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976), because the school board meeting was a public forum opened by the
state. Knight, 465 U.S. at 281 (citing City of Madison, 429 U.S. at 175). In Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983), the Court used the school board meeting in
City of Madison as an example of a public forum that the state did not need to create or maintain. Yet
the Court stressed that as long as the forum is public, the First Amendment precludes certain exclu-
sions from it.
213. I offer the following statutory language, as an additional paragraph in § 9(a) and in analo-
gous legislation governing the public sector, to implement the modifications I recommend:
The principle of exclusive representation shall apply to units composed primarily of profes-
sional employees: Provided, that in such units the employer may discuss any subject with
professional employees, either individually or in groups or through committees, without the
intervention of the exclusive bargaining representative: Provided further, that these discus-
sions are in addition to, and not a substitute for, bargaining in good faith about the same
subjects with the exclusive representative.
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acceptable to representatives of a majority and that the agreement must
apply to the entire workforce. Yet he objected to the exclusion of substan-
tial minorities from the bargaining process, a result he understood section
9(a) to compel. Senator Walsh, supported by Magruder, responded that
nothing in section 9(a) prevents minority groups from talking to an em-
ployer about matters subject to collective bargaining before the employer
signs a contract with the exclusive representative. The purpose of section
9(a), Walsh and Magruder stressed, is to insure that minority groups do
not become partners in negotiations between the exclusive representative
and the employer. Yet they believed that as long as this basic rule is fol-
lowed, relationships between minority groups and employers are
permissible.214
Magruder added that the employer, "in deciding whether to accede to
any demands proposed by the majority would, I assume, be at liberty to
hear representations from minority groups who claim there is some un-
fairness in the proposal." '215 Walsh agreed, but also observed that the em-
ployer, when about to sign a contract with the exclusive representative,
might tell the minority group, "I have heard you fully; I know what the
majority views are and I know what the minority views are, and now I
must end these negotiations by dealing with the majority."216
Merrit, though attracted to this position," 7 thought it was inconsistent
with the language of section 9(a). The main provision of section 9(a), he
pointed out, gives the majority union the role of exclusive representative
"for the purposes of collective bargaining," not simply for the purpose of
signing an agreement. The proviso that "any individual employee or
group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances
to their employer through representatives of their own choosing," he
added, only "very guardedly" allows the presentation of grievances, and
the word grievance is much too narrow to cover discussions about what
the contents of a collective bargaining agreement should be."1
The deletion of the phrase "through representatives of their own choos-
ing" from section 9(a) in the enacted legislation21 ' and subsequent inter-
pretation of the distinction between grievances and bargaining2 show
214. Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 320-22 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIsr. NLRA, supra note 150, at 1695, 1706-08 (state-
ments of Merritt, Walsh, and Magruder).
215. Id. at 322, reprinted in 2 LEG. HisT. NLRA, supra note 150, at 1695, 1708.
216. Id. at 323, reprinted in 2 LEG. HisT. NLRA, supra note 150, at 1695, 1709.
217. Id. at 320, reprinted in 2 LEG. HIsT. NLRA, supra note 150, at 1695, 1706. At another
point in the legislative history, however, Merritt proposed amendments that would have implemented
proportional representation in bargaining. Memorandum Comparing S. 2926 (73d Cong.) and S.
1958 (74th Cong.) Senate Comm. Print, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935), reprinted in 1 LEG. HiST.
NLRA, supra note 150, at 1319, 1335-36.
218. Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 323, reprinted in 2 LEG. HIsT. NLRA, supra note 150, at 1695, 1709.
219. See supra text accompanying note 169.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 176-78.
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that Walsh and Magruder's proposed interpretation of exclusive represen-
tation did not prevail. As Walsh and Magruder stressed, however, the
main advantages of exclusive representation can be retained even if the
employer independently discusses subjects of bargaining with minority
groups of employees. This Article's proposed modification of exclusive
representation in both private and public sector professional employment
preserves many of the doctrine's benefits while allowing substantially
more contacts between employers and employees.
2. The Potential Effectiveness of Weakened Exclusive Representation
My proposal for a weakened principle of exclusive representation
would still prohibit employers' attempts to bypass the elected union. In
recent years, the NLRB has found employer unfair labor practices when
a state affiliate of the National Education Association engaged in direct
negotiations with staff members over transfers to other positions,22 a
medical care program instituted a new work schedule by soliciting individ-
ual waivers of provisions in the collective bargaining agreement covering
222 coeovertime pay, and a college offered faculty members individual con-
tracts governing salary and other conditions of employment.223 My propo-
sal would not permit this behavior by employers of professional employees
because it involves attempts to deal with employees as "a substitute for,"
not "in addition to," good faith bargaining with the elected union.224
Nor would my proposed revision permit employers to use the language
of cooperation, which is so often stressed in the context of professional
employment, to circumvent the duty to bargain with the exclusive union
representative. Recent cases demonstrate this danger. The NLRB, for ex-
ample, found that a nonprofit medical care facility, which emphasized its
desire to "restore harmony" after a union victory in an election, violated
its duty to bargain exclusively with the union. Instead of dealing with the
union regarding working conditions and grievances, the facility hired an
independent consultant who met with employees regarding a new em-
ployee handbook and procedures for investigating alleged violations of
work rules.225 Similarly, a circuit court held that an employer had com-
mitted an unfair labor practice by attempting to convince employees, after
negotiations with the union broke down, to accept reductions in benefits as
part of a "partnership solution" to the employer's alleged financial
problems. 22' And another circuit court concluded that a "Speak Out" pro-
221. Kansas Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 275 N.L.R.B. 638 (1985).
222. Kaiser Permanente Medical Care Program, 248 N.L.R.B. 147 (1980).
223. Kendall College, 228 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1977), enforced, 570 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1978).
224. See supra note 213 (proposed statutory language).
225. St. Mary's Home, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1030-32 (1981), enforced in part and enforce-
ment denied in part on other grounds, 690 F.2d 1062 (4th Cir. 1982).
226. NLRB v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 497 F.2d 747 (6th Cir. 1974).
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gram, instituted by an employer to promote "efficiency, harmony, and un-
derstanding," undermined the exclusive representative by interfering with
the grievance procedure in the collective bargaining agreement.2  The
court observed that this program could allow the resolution of grievances
before the union had notice of the dispute or an opportunity to be
heard.228 All of these cases should be decided the same way under my
proposed amendment to section 9(a) because the employer had not bar-
gained in good faith with the union.
Despite its continued application to many of the contexts in which vio-
lations currently occur, the proposed modification of exclusive representa-
tion does create some of the dangers that advocates of the present law
feared. Even though employers would still be required to negotiate and
sign a collective bargaining agreement with the union covering all employ-
ees in the unit, the dramatic increase in the number of occasions for em-
ployers and employees to discuss issues that are also subjects of bargaining
provide opportunities for employers to divide the employees and weaken
the union's power. Yet the cost of the traditional interpretation of exclu-
sive representation to healthy relationships between employers and profes-
sional employees substantially outweighs this danger. Even from the
union's perspective, moreover, the benefits from my coordinated proposal
to expand the scope of bargaining far exceeds the costs imposed by loosen-
ing the principle of exclusive representation. Unions gain much more
from compelling bargaining over crucial issues that are now permissive
than they lose from the greater ability of employers and employees to dis-
cuss the relatively narrow range of current mandatory subjects outside the
union context.
III. COMPANY DOMINATION
The prohibition against company domination complements the princi-
ple of exclusive representation and complicates analysis of permissible
contacts between employers and employees outside the union rubric. Sec-
tion 8(a)(2) of the NLRA states that it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration
of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it
... 1"22 Section 2(5) defines a "labor organization" as "any organiza-
tion of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or
plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in
whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of
227. United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 536 F.2d 550, 559 (3d Cir. 1976).
228. Id. at 557.
229. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982).
1990]
The Yale Law Journal
work."' 30 Not every group of employees necessarily constitutes a "labor
organization." It is also theoretically possible to "deal with" a "labor or-
ganization" about the topics specified in section 2(5) without "dominat-
ing" or "interfering" with it. But the legislative history of these related
provisions and the Supreme Court's subsequent construction of them
stressed that virtually any continuing body of employees dealing with the
employer about mandatory subjects of bargaining is "dominated" unless it
is entirely free from employer support or influence. 3 1
Congress and the Supreme Court initially developed and interpreted the
interaction between sections 8(a)(2) and 2(5) in the context of industrial
employment. These provisions, however, create substantial obstacles to the
collegial bodies that are so important to many professional employees and
their employers. Various councils of professionals and joint committees of
professionals and administrators typically fit within the definition of pro-
hibited labor organizations under sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) or under anal-
ogous provisions in laws governing public employment. Some recent lower
court decisions, often in cases involving professional employees, have up-
held committee structures apparently prohibited by the traditional inter-
pretation of these provisions. Yet the lower court decisions, when read
against the legislative history and the Supreme Court precedents, are doc-
trinally confused or unconvincing.
A. Legislative History
The eradication of the widespread company unionism designed by em-
ployers to thwart the organization of independent unions was a key con-
cern of the framers of the Wagner Act.232 Company unions, the framers
stressed, make a "mockery" of the right of employees to self-organization
and reduce the process of collective bargaining to a "sham" by allowing
the employer to sit on both sides of the negotiating table.233 Company
domination of unions, they added, is not conducive to industrial peace.
Good labor relations depend on the confidence of employees in the organi-
zations that represent them, and the competition between company unions
and independent unions perpetuates bitterness and strife.24
Yet even avid supporters of section 8(a)(2) expressed concern that its
strong prohibitions against company unionism might go too far in limiting
discussions between employers and employees. They claimed that the pro-
viso to section 8(a)(2), which allows "employees to confer with [an em-
230. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982).
231. See infra Sections IIIA & 1B.
232. See Kohler, supra note 27, at 527-31.
233. H.R. REP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEG. HiST. NLRA,
supra note 150, at 2910, 2925.
234. S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST. NLRA, supra
note 150, at 2300, 2310.
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ployer] during working hours without loss of time or pay," averted this
danger. They added that this proviso did not introduce a subterfuge for
avoiding the fundamental prohibition against company unions. Employers
who provide normal pay only while conferring with favored organizations,
they made clear, commit an unfair labor practice.2"5
The broad definition of a labor organization in section 2(5), designed to
reinforce the prohibition against company unions, more directly limited
the freedom of employers and employees to interact apart from the exclu-
sive representative. Employers had argued that various employee repre-
sentation plans attacked as company unions by members of Congress were
not labor organizations at all, but were "simply a method of contact be-
tween employers and employees." Many of these plans, precisely because
they were dominated by employers, only dealt with and adjusted griev-
ances and did not involve collective bargaining. Unless these plans were
prohibited, Congress concluded, most of the employer domination it was
seeking to eliminate would not be covered and the legislation would be
"entirely nullified."2 ' To avoid this result, section 2(5) defined a labor
organization to include groups "dealing with employers concerning griev-
ances." A memorandum prepared for the Senate Committee on Education
and Labor interpreted this definition to preclude the employer from or-
ganizing "a shop committee to present grievances on questions of safety
and other minor matters even though he does not use such shop committee
as a subterfuge for collective bargaining on the essential points of wages
and hours. '23 7 Underlining its commitment to this position, Congress de-
cided to reject a proposed amendment to section 2(5), presented as "the
joint thought of the Department of Labor" by Secretary Perkins,2"8 which
would have allowed the presentation of grievances outside the union ru-
bric by substituting "bargaining collectively with" for "dealing with" in
section 2(5).239
The original House bill proposed during the debates that eventually led
to the Taft-Hartley Amendments contained a provision stating that if no
exclusive representative exists, an employer could form or maintain a
committee of employees for the purpose of "discussing with it matters of
mutual interest, including grievances, wages, hours of employment, and
235. Id.
236. Memorandum Comparing S. 2926 (73d Cong.) and S. 1958 (74th Cong.) Senate Comm.
Print, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1935), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIsT. NLRA, supra note 150, at 1319,
1347.
237. Id. at 1, reprinted in 1 LEG. HisT. NLRA, supra note 150, at 1319, 1320; see also, S. REP.
No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEG. HisT. NLRA, supra note 150, at 2300,
2306 (term "labor organization" deliberately "phrased very broadly" to include employee-
representation committees and plans under prohibitions of § 8).
238. Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 66 (1935) (statement of Secretary Perkins), reprinted in 1 LEG. HisT. NLRA, supra note 150,
at 1433, 1442.
239. Id. at 67, reprinted in 1 LEG. HIsT. NLRA, supra note 150, at 1433, 1443.
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other working conditions . *.". .""' The framers of this provision viewed
it as an exception to section 8(a)(2). Impressed by the effectiveness of la-
bor-management committees established with government encouragement
during World War II, they wanted to permit the continuation of these
committees during peacetime. They insisted that this provision did not re-
introduce company unionism. While the employer and the committee
could "discuss and reach decisions,"41 neither party could compel the
other to engage in formal negotiations or to make agreements. Nor could
the committee be a "formal organization" exhibiting the "common charac-
teristics of a labor union."24
The House minority, however, maintained that this provision would
"resurrect and legitimatize" the very company unions that section 8(a)(2)
was enacted to destroy. That these committees would not have the formal
characteristics of labor organizations only exacerbated their probability of
becoming "the nucleus for a company-dominated organization" unable to
bargain effectively on behalf of employees. Allowing their continuation,
the minority added, would undermine the current organizing efforts of
243unions.
This provision did not pass. But its supporters implied that the new
language in the proviso to section 9(a), by permitting employers to answer
the grievances of individual employees and groups of employees, allowed
the discussions between employers and employees that the unsuccessful
proposal explicitly authorized. 4' This implication, however, was not con-
vincing. The new proviso to section 9(a) did not suggest that group griev-
ances could be equated with informal discussions between committees of
employees and employers on subjects of bargaining.
4 5
B. Supreme Court Decisions
Two unanimous Supreme Court decisions, which broadly construed the
definition of a labor organization under section 2(5) and the meaning of
company domination under section 8(a)(2), loom over interpretation of
these key statutory provisions. They reflect the concern, emphasized
throughout the legislative history, that employee committees lacking struc-
240. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. LMRA, supra note
30, at 31, 56.
241. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1947), reprinted in I LEG. HIST. LMRA,
supra note 30, at 292, 324.
242. Id.
243. H.R. MIN. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST.
LMRA, supra note 30, at 355, 376; see also id. at 77, reprinted in I LEG. HIsT. LMRA, supra note
30, at 355, 368 (warning that proposed changes in definitions of labor organization and company
domination constituted "an open invitation to revival of company-dominated unions").
244. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1947), reprinted in I LEG. HIST.
LMRA, supra note 30, at 505, 549.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 168-78 (discussing original proviso to § 9(a), Taft-
Hartley Amendments to it, and interpretive case law since Taft-Hartley).
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tural independence from the employer contain the seeds of company domi-
nation. According to the Court in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co.,246 the
"dealing with employers" that defines a labor organization in section 2(5)
is a much broader concept than collective bargaining. Discussions that do
not amount to collective bargaining may still constitute dealing. And in
NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.,247 the Court em-
phasized that an employer violates section 8(a)(2) even if the employer
establishes and supports a labor organization for the best organizational
reasons and without any hostility toward unions.
The employer in Cabot Carbon, following the suggestion of the War
Production Board during World War II, established employee commit-
tees. The employer continued these committees or formed new ones after
the war ended. 48 The employer and employee representatives drafted the
committee bylaws. These bylaws stated that the committees would meet
with management to provide a forum for considering employee ideas on
matters such as safety, efficiency, ingenuity, initiative, conservation of sup-
plies and equipment, and grievances at nonunion plants.2 49 Eventually,
some employee committees discussed additional concerns, including senior-
ity, job classifications, working schedules, sick leave, and the improvement
of company facilities and working conditions. Company officials some-
times granted committee requests, sometimes referred them to local man-
agers, and sometimes rejected them.250
At many of the company plants, the employee committee coexisted with
an exclusive union representative.25' For many years, no union com-
plained about the existence of the employee committees.252 Eventually,
however, a union affiliated with the AFL sought to abolish them. The
246. 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
247. 308 U.S. 241 (1939).
248. 360 U.S. at 205; Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 8-9, NLRB v. Cabot
Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959) (No. 329).
249. 360 U.S. at 205-06 n.2.
250. Id. at 207-08, 213-14.
251. Id. at 209. The employee and union committees at the same plant often had overlapping
membership; occasionally, the same employee chaired or served as the grievance representative for
both committees. Cabot Carbon Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 1633, 1644 (1957), enforcement denied, 256 F.2d
281 (5th Cir. 1958), rev'd, 360 U.S. 203 (1959) (affirming NLRB decision); Record at 420, 870, 876,
NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (No. 329) (1959). Yet the functions of these committees
generally remained separate. Although employee committees, sometimes in conjunction with union
committees, met with the employer to discuss and make suggestions about various conditions of em-
ployment, the employer and the employee committees never engaged in bargaining. 360 U.S. at
213-14; Record at 616, 909. One committee member testified that he did not feel free even to discuss
wage rates with the employer. Record at 801. After the election of an exclusive union representative,
the functions of the employee committees typically were reduced to matters of efficiency, the handling
of grievances for nonunion members, safety, and fund-raising for groups such as the Red Cross and
the Boy Scouts. 360 U.S. at 209; Record at 401, 406-07, 458, 868, 873.
252. Cabot Carbon Co. v. NLRB, 256 F.2d 281, 284 (5th Cir. 1958), rev'd, 360 U.S. 203
(1959). Indeed, some unions seemed pleased that these committees were handling secondary but help-
ful tasks that the unions themselves had no interest in performing. Record at 870, NLRB v. Cabot
Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959) (No. 329). When conflict between union and committee functions
arose, the committee generally yielded to the union. 256 F.2d at 284.
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union wanted to exercise exclusive responsibility over making suggestions
to the employer about conditions of employment.2 53 After the employer
refused, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging that the
employee committees were labor organizations dominated by the
employer.2
The proper interpretation of "dealing with employees" in section 2(5)
constituted the major legal debate in Cabot Carbon. While acknowledging
that "dealing with" is a broad phrase that includes the concept of "dis-
cussing with," the court of appeals refused to equate these two terms.
Instead, it treated "dealing with" as the equivalent of "bargaining
with"255 and concluded that "a group of employees is not a labor organi-
zation unless it exists for the purpose of negotiating or bargaining with
employers.125 6 According to the court, an employee committee or other
combination of employees can discuss subjects of bargaining with the em-
ployer and even present grievances as long as no bargaining occurs. 25
The unanimous Supreme Court convincingly rejected this interpretation
of section 2(5). The Court reinforced its observation that "dealing with" is
more inclusive than "bargaining with" by citing Secretary Perkins' failed
proposal to substitute "bargaining with" for "dealing with" when Con-
gress originally included section 2(5) in the Wagner Act. The reenactment
of section 2(5) without change in the Taft-Hartley Amendments and the
consistent judicial identification of employee committees as labor organiza-
tions provided further support for the Court's conclusion. The Court per-
suasively refuted the lower court's suggestion that the language added to
section 9(a) by the Taft-Hartley Amendments essentially incorporated the
unsuccessful House proposal to allow employee committees established
during World War II. It distinguished the presentation of group griev-
ances permitted under section 9(a) from the presentation of such griev-
ances by "an employee committee," which is a " 'labor organization' as
defined in section 2(5) and used in section 8(a)(2)." '258
Underlying this debate over the meaning of the term "dealing with"
was a fundamental disagreement over whether these employee committees
presented a danger of company domination. The Trial Examiner cited as
evidence of domination his finding that "all aspects of collective bargain-
ing are either frustrated or entirely absent." '59 Revealingly, the court of
appeals cited this language to support its conclusion that the employee
253. Record at 938-39, NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959) (No. 329).
254. 360 U.S. at 206-07.
255. 256 F.2d at 286.
256. Id. at 285.
257. Id. at 288-89.
258. 360 U.S. at 217-18; see supra text accompanying notes 238-39 (Perkins proposal), 164-69
(legislative history of proviso to § 9(a)), 244-45 (unconvincing reading of Taft-Hartley proviso to §
9(a) by supporters of defeated exception to § 8(a)(2)).
259. Cabot Carbon Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 1633, 1647.
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committees were not labor organizations subject to the prohibition against
company domination in section 8(a)(2).260 The Supreme Court explicitly
rejected the lower court's reasoning and conclusion.2"'
The Supreme Court's decision in Cabot Carbon, a case involving a rel-
atively sympathetic employer, underlined the breadth of its definition of a
labor organization under section 2(5). Yet at least in theory, Cabot Car-
bon did leave some room for discussions about mandatory subjects without
union involvement as long as these discussions do not shade into the actual
bargaining that section 9(a) reserves to the exclusive agent. For example,
some groupings of employees may not constitute labor organizations even
if they deal with the employer about these subjects. Perhaps a spontane-
ous group, as opposed to an ongoing employee committee, would not be
defined as a labor organization. In addition, as the Supreme Court
stressed in Cabot Carbon, an employer can deal even with a labor organi-
zation about conditions of employment as long as it steers clear of the
prohibitions against domination, interference, and support found in sec-
tion 8(a)(2).262
The Supreme Court's prior construction of section 8(a)(2), however,
was as strict as its view of section 2(5) in Cabot Carbon. It therefore
seemed likely that the Court would find dealing with an employee organi-
zation evidence of unlawful domination or interference. The Supreme
Court's major interpretation of section 8(a)(2), its 1939 decision in New-
port News, anticipated Cabot Carbon by applying the prohibitions of the
NLRA against a relatively sympathetic employer. In 1927, before Con-
gress passed the Wagner Act, the employer had instituted an employee
representation plan in cooperation with its employees. Immediately after
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the NLRA in 1937, the
employer changed the plan in ways designed to meet NLRA require-
ments. It replaced the joint committee of employee and employer repre-
sentatives in the original plan with a committee composed solely of repre-
260. 256 F.2d at 290. The court of appeals deleted the word "entirely" from its quotation of the
Trial Examiner.
261. 360 U.S. at 212-13. The longstanding and generally peaceful coexistence of an employee
committee and a labor union at many of the employer's plants provided an additional argument
against defining the committees as labor organizations. The employer emphasized that it had origi-
nally established the committees at the government's request rather than to deter the threat of unioni-
zation or to "serve as disguised bargaining agents." Brief for Respondents in Opposition to Petition
for Certiorari at 10, NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959) (No. 329). The employer had
never been accused of anti-union animus and had bargained in good faith with whatever unions the
employees elected. According to the employer, this possibly unique combination of factors constituted
"mute but indisputable evidence that the committees served no purpose at which even the original
Section 8(a)(2) of the Act was aimed." Brief for Respondents at 20. The Supreme Court did not
respond directly to this argument, apparently concluding that the language and legislative history of §
2(5) precluded an exception when an entity that otherwise qualifies as a labor organization coexists
with a union. Without explicitly so stating, the Supreme Court, perhaps influenced by the related
principle of exclusive representation, recognized the union's right to prevent another employee organi-
zation from sharing any role regarding mandatory subjects.
262. 360 U.S. at 218.
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sentatives elected by employees. The new plan also eliminated employer
payments to employee representatives."' 3
The Supreme Court readily acknowledged many positive aspects of the
employee representation plan. All labor disputes had been effectively set-
tled under it. The employer had never tried to prevent employees from
joining labor unions and had never discriminated against those who did
join. The overwhelming majority of employees had voted in elections for
employee representatives, which had been held without any interference
from the employer. Moreover, in a secret ballot referendum, the employ-
ees voted overwhelmingly to continue the employee representation plan as
modified in 1937.264
These facts prompted the court of appeals' refusal to hold that the plan
violated section 8(a)(2). The court recognized that the Wagner Act had
been designed to protect the rights of employees to select representatives of
their own choosing and to bargain collectively "with complete freedom
and independence." The court also acknowledged that this right had been
"too frequently denied in the past." Yet the court insisted that these rights
would be destroyed rather than vindicated by disestablishing an organiza-
tion freely chosen by a huge majority of employees.265
The Supreme Court, however, maintained that the relationship be-
tween the employer and the employee representation plan violated the
prohibitions against employer domination and interference in section
8(a)(2). It stressed that the statute required structural independence of the
labor organization from the employer. "In applying the statutory test of
independence," the Court concluded, "it is immaterial that the plan had
in fact not engendered, or indeed had obviated, serious labor disputes in
the past, or that any company interference in the administration of the
plan had been incidental" and the result of "good motives.
2 66
C. NLRB and Appellate Court Decisions
The appellate courts and the NLRB have generally followed the Su-
preme Court's broad definitions of section 2(5) in Cabot Carbon and of
section 8(a)(2) in Newport News. Under this approach, several decisions
have held that employers violated section 8(a)(2) by establishing and sup-
porting committees of professional employees. Yet some appellate courts,
particularly in recent years, have tried to limit the reach of these Supreme
Court precedents, often in cases involving professional employees. They
have harnessed creative interpretations of sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) to a
theory of the NLRA's overall structure that emphasizes cooperative labor
263. 308 U.S. at 244-47.
264. Id. at 248.
265. 101 F.2d 841, 847 (4th Cir. 1939), rev'd, 308 U.S. 241 (1939).
266. 308 U.S. at 251.
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relations and employee free choice rather than the traditional concern
about the structural independence of labor organizations. While acknowl-
edging the tension between a literal interpretation of these two provisions
and the general purposes attributed to the entire NLRA, the innovative
lower courts maintain that a legitimate reconciliation can be achieved.
Most of their decisions, however, are unpersuasive.
The juxtaposition of sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) suggests a logical analyti-
cal progression. First, determine whether an entity is the kind of grouping
of employees that can constitute a "labor organization" under section 2(5).
Next, examine whether the labor organization is "dealing with" the em-
ployer concerning the matters specified in section 2(5). Finally, evaluate
whether the employer, in dealing with the labor organization, has violated
the prohibitions in section 8(a)(2) against domination, interference, and
support.
Few cases, however, follow such a neat formula. They frequently pay
more attention to an underlying conceptual issue than to the particular
statutory provision. The NLRB and the courts have addressed such issues
as employer motivation, employee free choice, and the importance of la-
bor-management cooperation both in defining a labor organization under
section 2(5) and in determining employer domination, interference, or
support under section 8(a)(2). This overlap does not indicate mere analyt-
ical carelessness or conceptual confusion. As the legislative histories of
these two statutory provisions indicate, and as the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Cabot Carbon and Newport News reflect, sections 2(5) and
8(a)(2) are so closely related that the same issues can arise with respect to
both.
1. Traditional Analysis
Cases following the traditional analysis established by Cabot Carbon
and Newport News have held that various employee committees were la-
bor organizations under section 2(5) and that employers had violated sec-
tion 8(a)(2). These cases stressed that employers had mandated, or at least
had encouraged, the formation of committees, and had controlled their
composition, administration, and meetings.267 Employers lost section
8(a)(2) cases by reserving the right to approve committee bylaws, prepar-
ing the minutes of committee meetings, and deciding whether a particular
issue fell within the jurisdiction of the employee committee or the
union.2 68 Committee meetings on employer property during paid working
267. See, e.g., NLRB v. Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 291 (6th Cir.
1982); South Nassau Communities Hosp., 247 N.L.R.B. 527, 530 (1980); Alta Bates Hosp., 226
N.L.R.B. 485, 490 (1976); North Am. Rockwell Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. 833, 837-38 (1971).
268. See, e.g., South Nassau Communities Hosp., 247 N.L.R.B. at 530; Alta Bates Hosp., 226
N.L.R.B. at 490; North Am. Rockwell Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. at 837-38.
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time prompted findings of section 8(a)(2) violations.269 So did indications
that employee committees lacked independent sources of funds.2 70 Al-
though some of these cases cited employer bad faith as part of the evi-
dence, they made clear that even employers who acted in good faith could
not escape section 8(a)(2) prohibitions against interference, domination,
and support.
271
The professional purposes of employee committees did not sway tradi-
tional analysis under section 2(5) or section 8(a)(2). For example, the
Board, citing Newport News, rejected the argument that a hospital is free
to dominate an advisory committee of nurses "so long as the purpose of
such an organization is to improve patient care." The Board agreed with
the hospital that Congress had passed the 1974 health care amendments to
the NLRA to encourage a form of unionization that would improve health
care. Yet the Board noted that Congress, while adding several provisions
to existing law to address this goal, had made no changes in either section
2(5) or section 8(a)(2).272 While recognizing in another case that an advi-
sory committee of nurses considered many professional issues outside the
scope of mandatory bargaining, the Board found that these permissible
contacts did not "negate" the committee's role in "dealing with" the hos-
pital administrators about matters specified in section 2(5).217
2. Innovative Analysis
Courts that depart from the traditional approach to sections 2(5) and
8(a)(2)274 have resisted finding company domination of a labor organiza-
269. See, e.g., Alta Bates Hosp., 226 N.L.R.B. at 491; North Am. Rockwell Corp., 191 N.L.R.B.
at 837-38. But see South Nassau Communities Hosp., 247 N.L.R.B. at 530 (meetings were bargain-
ing sessions not prohibited by 8(a)(2)).
270. See, e.g., Alta Bates Hosp., 226 N.L.R.B. at 490.
271. See, e.g., South Nassau Communities Hosp., 247 N.L.R.B. at 530; Alta Bates Hosp., 226
N.L.R.B. at 491. In Alta Bates the Board added that employer motivation, while irrelevant to a
charge under § 8(a)(2), is a defense to an alleged violation of the duty to bargain in good faith under
§ 8(a)(5). Id.
272. Alta Bates Hosp., 226 N.L.R.B. at 491.
273. South Nassau Communities Hosp., 247 N.L.R.B. at 530. Indeed, § 2(5) states that an em-
ployee committee is a labor organization if it deals "in whole or in part" with these matters. 29
U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982) (emphasis added).
274. Several articles have evaluated this innovative case analysis. Slight variations exist in the
characterization of the innovations. Compare Note, Does Employer Implementation of Employee Pro-
duction Teams Violate Section 8(aX2) of the National Labor Relations Act?, 49 IND. L.J. 516,
533-35 (1974) [hereinafter Indiana Note] (focusing on subjective perspective of employees, distinction
between illegal support and permissible aid that falls short of "control," and distinction between ille-
gal "actual domination or interference" and permissible "potential domination or interference") with
Note, New Standards for Domination and Support Under Section 8(aX2), 82 YALE L.J. 510,
520-25 (1973) [hereinafter Yale Note] (focusing on employer intent to coerce and employee free
choice).
Substantial disagreement exists about the persuasiveness of this innovative case analysis as doctrine
or policy. See, e.g., Kohler, supra note 27, at 543-51 (rejecting innovative analysis as inconsistent
with purposes of NLRA and as bad policy because threatening to autonomous employee associations);
Sockell, supra note 27 (approving innovative analysis as good policy while concluding that it violates
§§ 2(5), 8(a)(2), and 9(a) of NLRA); Note, Collective Bargaining as an Industrial System: An
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tion simply because an employee committee lacks the institutional strength
that guarantees independence from the employer."" They have stressed
instead employee free choice, employer motivation, and the desirability of
cooperation between labor and management.
If uncoerced employees recognized the difference between a weak com-
mittee structure and a union and still preferred employee committees,
some courts refused to construe the NLRA as precluding this choice.276
Employees' freedom to reject collective bargaining, they reasoned, should
include the freedom to accept employee committees. 277 According to an
especially graphic judge, the NLRA does not require either the employer
or the NLRB to "baby" employees into choosing a union bargaining
agent instead of employee committees.27 8 Whatever the actual structure of
an employee organization, these courts seemed willing to find unfair labor
practices only if the employer either misled the employees into thinking
the organization was the functional equivalent of a collective bargaining
agent279 or otherwise "exerted subtle and insidious control over ignorant
or protesting employees." 280 Even employer attempts to control weak com-
Argument Against Judicial Revision of Section 8(aX2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 96
HARV. L. REv. 1662 (1983) (opposing focus of innovative decisions on employee free choice as incon-
sistent with current structure of labor law and labor relations based on arms-length bargaining);
Indiana Note, supra (opposing innovative analysis as inconsistent with NLRA policy of guaranteeing
structural independence of labor unions); Note, Participatory Management Under Sections 2(5) and
8(aX2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1736 (1985) (supporting emphasis on
employee free choice in innovative analysis as furthering policy of NLRA and distinguishing permissi-
ble participatory committees from traditional representation committees); Note, Rethinking the Adver-
sarial Model in Labor Relations: An Argument for Repeal of Section 8(aX2), 96 YALE L.J. 2021
(1987) (supporting policy conclusions of innovative decisions while claiming that they are inconsistent
with congressional intent); Yale Note, supra (supporting policy conclusions of innovative decisions
and claiming that they are consistent with congressional intent).
275. See, e.g., NLRB v. Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 293-94 (6th Cir.
1982); Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915, 918-19 (6th Cir. 1968); Modern Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 1967); Coppus Eng'g Corp. v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 564,
572, 573 (1st Cir. 1957); Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955);
General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1234 (1977).
276. See, e.g., Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d at 295. Cases interpreting § 2(5)
pointed out that employers established employee committees without the prompting of union organiz-
ing drives or employee unrest which could have led to unionization. See, e.g., General Foods Corp.,
231 N.L.R.B. at 1234. These committees may appropriately be perceived as alternatives to unioniza-
tion, but should not be defined as labor organizations for that reason alone. See, e.g., id. at 1235 n.4.
277. The fact that employees, who worked under a system of employee committees, twice rejected
a union in fair elections convinced one court not to disturb the status quo. Any other decision would
"tip the scales" against the employees' own free choice and in favor of the unionization they clearly
did not want. Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d at 295. Similarly, evidence that em-
ployees themselves suggested employee committees and rejected unions in free elections convinced
courts to reject claims that employers had violated § 8(a)(2). See, e.g., Modern Plastics Corp., 379
F.2d at 204; Coppus Eng'g Corp., 240 F.2d at 571-73; Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co., 221 F.2d at
168-69. Even the employer's commission of an unfair labor practice during a prior election campaign
did not dissuade a court from citing employee free choice as the reason for refusing to find that a
committee composed of associates and partners at an architectural firm violated § 8(a)(2), Hertzka &
Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 627, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975).
For my disagreement with this decision, see infra note 307.
278. Coppus Eng'g Corp., 240 F.2d at 574 (Magruder, J., concurring).
279. E.g., Federal-Mogul Corp., 394 F.2d at 918.
280. Modern Plastics Corp., 379 F.2d at 204.
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mittees did not constitute prohibited domination. These attempts were
permissible because the employees resisted and remained independent. 81
A relentless hostility against employee committees, moreover, "erects an
iron curtain between employer and employees" that can be penetrated
only by an exclusive union representative.2 82 The NLRB should not
"abort" an employer's healthy cooperative relationship with groups of em-
ployees simply because "an outside union wants to take over."28 A more
recent decision added that "changing conditions in the labor-management
field seem to have strengthened the case for providing room for coopera-
tive employer-employee arrangements as alternatives to the traditional ad-
versary model."2 8' And one case suggested that the traditional "close con-
tact" between professional employees and their employers would make a
committee system in which management representatives participate an at-
tractive alternative to collective bargaining.285
These innovative decisions have approved employee committees exhibit-
ing characteristics that under traditional analysis led to findings of unlaw-
ful domination, interference, or support. Committees met on company
time and on company premises, used company bulletin boards, and re-
ceived company assistance in the preparation of minutes.28 Committees
had no membership dues or other independent means of financial sup-
port.287 Nor did committees have formal constitutions or bylaws.-88 Em-
ployers did not provide any protection against discipline or dismissal for
employees who served on these committees.28 And committees sometimes
included management representatives 90 or employees chosen by manage-
ment.291 Some decisions attempted to justify these results by describing
281. See, e.g., Federal-Mogul Corp., 394 F.2d at 920.
282. NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 289 F.2d 177, 182 (5th Cir. 1961) (Wisdom, J., dissenting in
part). Judge Wisdom had written the circuit court opinion that the Supreme Court reversed in Cabot
Carbon.
283. Modern Plastics Corp., 379 F.2d at 204.
284. NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208, 1214 (1st Cir. 1979).
285. An associate in an architectural firm proposed such a "weak" committee system after the
employees decertified a union that itself had attempted unsuccessfully to negotiate a similar scheme as
a complement to the collective bargaining relationship. The court held that the adoption of this propo-
sal did not violate § 8(a)(2), even though the employer had committed another unfair labor practice
that invalidated the decertification election. Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 631, passim
(9th Cir. 1974); for my disagreement with this decision, see infra note 307.
286. See, e.g., Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d at 1214; Hertzha & Knowles, 503 F.2d at 629;
Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915, 919 (6th Cir. 1968); Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB, 221 F.2d 165, 170 (7th Cir. 1955).
287. See, e.g., Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d at 1214; Federal-Mogul Corp., 394 F.2d at 918;
Modern Plastics Corp., 379 F.2d at 202; Coppus Eng'g Corp v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 564, 572 (1st Cir.
1957).
288. See, e.g., Federal-Mogul Corp., 394 F.2d at 918; Modern Plastics Corp., 379 F.2d at 202.
289. See, e.g., Coppus Eng'g Corp., 240 F.2d at 572; Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co., 221 F.2d at
170.
290. See, e.g., Hertzka & Knowles, 503 F.2d at 626.
291. See, e.g., Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d at 1211.
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facts indicating management control as "de minimis" or as only part of
"the totality of the evidence. "292
3. The Unpersuasiveness of Doctrinal Innovations
Most of the attempts by the lower courts to limit Cabot Carbon and
Newport News are clearly inconsistent with these Supreme Court prece-
dents and with the legislative history of the NLRA." 3 Congress designed
sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) as interlocking provisions to eradicate and pre-
vent the resurgence of the company-dominated organizations that had pre-
viously plagued independent unions and employees. It assumed that effec-
tive employee organizations must be independent from employer control
and that independence requires strength. Many of the factors cited by the
lower courts-including the desirability of labor-management cooperation,
the existence of employee free choice, and the employer's motivation-are
irrelevant to this fundamental congressional emphasis on strong and inde-
pendent employee organizations.
Congress insisted on a broad definition of a labor organization in sec-
tion 2(5) to insure that the prohibitions against company interference and
domination in section 8(a)(2) would extend to employee organizations too
weak even to bargain. This concern prompted Congress to use the term
"deal" rather than "bargain," to include grievances and relatively minor
matters under the definition of dealing, and to indicate that labor organi-
zations could be dominated even if they are not used as "a subterfuge for
collective bargaining."2 4 Worries about the potential resurrection of com-
pany unions prompted Congress to reject proposals which would have
weakened the prohibitions in section 8(a)(2) and permitted the continua-
tion of employee committees established during World War II. Opponents
of these proposals did not claim that the employee committees were inef-
fective or that employers actually had dominated them. They simply wor-
ried that the committees could be easily transformed into "subservient"
labor organizations imposed by employers on employees.29 5 Passage of
these proposals would have allowed many of the interpretations uncon-
vincingly proffered in the subsequent lower court cases. Their rejection,
however, reinforced the original emphasis in the Wagner Act on the need
for structural autonomy of employee organizations.
Nor were the innovative lower courts convincing in tying their reinter-
pretation of sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) to employee free choice and labor-
management cooperation. The courts accurately identified the importance
292. See, e.g., Federal-Mogul Corp., 394 F.2d at 921; Coppus Eng'g Corp., 240 F.2d at 573
(majority), 574 (concurrence).
293. The articles cited supra note 274 present differing views on this issue.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 236-39.
295. H.R. MIN. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 85, reprinted in 1 LEG. HIsT. LMRA,
supra note 30, at 355, 376.
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of both goals in the NLRA. Protecting employee free choice is central to
the Wagner Act, and the Taft-Hartley Amendments stress that this free-
dom includes the right to "refrain" from union activities.298 The introduc-
tion to the NLRA, moreover, specifies "the friendly adjustment of indus-
trial disputes" as a fundamental policy."' Yet sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2)
reflect the congressional judgment, based on the prior experience of em-
ployer domination, that neither free choice nor cooperation can truly exist
when employee organizations lack the independence provided by strength.
Weak organizations of employees, Congress concluded, are too easily
manipulated by employers in ways that may give the appearance of free
choice and cooperation but that actually undermine both. The NLRA
thus protects the right of employees to vote against union representation
but does not allow them to choose organizational structures that Congress
feared would permit, and even encourage, employer domination. Congress
considered this danger too high to risk cooperative and possibly construc-
tive experiments with weak committees of employees. The legislative
choice-expressed in the Wagner Act and reaffirmed by the Taft-Hartley
Amendments-may have been wrong, but it clearly limited alternatives to
unionization.
More technical attempts to distinguish traditional analysis are generally
unpersuasive as well. It is conceivable that certain discussions between
groups of employees and an employer may be permissible "conferring"
under the proviso to section 8(a)(2) and may not amount to the "dealings"
that constitute a labor organization under section 2(5). But periodic meet-
ings with an ongoing committee such as a faculty senate, in contrast to
more spontaneous interactions, seem to fit well within the definition of
dealing in section 2(5), particularly as interpreted by Cabot Carbon.298
296. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
297. Id. at § 151 (1982).
298. Courts observed that not all communication between an employer and employees should be
construed as "dealing" under section 2(5). During the course of conversations with an employer,
employees could move from discussions to "dealings" that transformed them from a group into a
"labor organization." See Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165, 169 (7th Cir. 1955).
Cabot Carbon, a subsequent decision observed, did not resolve the amount of interaction between the
employer and employees needed to find "dealing." NLRB v. Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co.,
691 F.2d 288, 291-92 (6th Cir. 1982). This derision even suggested that an employee committee
could make recommendations to the employer about conditions of employment without being desig-
nated a labor organization. It contrasted the "communication of ideas" with "a course of dealing."
While acknowledging that this "vital" difference "at times is seemingly indistinct," the court at-
tempted to give it meaning. The court unpersuasively stressed that "dealing" involves "a continuous
interaction between employer and committee" beyond the mere presentation on a periodic basis of
issues, questions, and complaints related to conditions of employment. Id. at 294.
Rejecting a university's claim that its faculty senate was a labor organization, the NLRB observed
in another case that the senate functioned as a group of advisory committees making recommendations
to the administration, a situation the Board considered "totally different from bargaining demands
that a union would make upon an employer during contract negotiations. . . ." Northeastern Uni-
versity, 218 N.L.R.B. 247, 248 (1975). In reaching this conclusion, the Board did not even refer to
Cabot Carbon, where the Supreme Court convincingly reversed the court of appeals precisely because
the lower court erroneously had defined "dealing with" under § 2(5) as the equivalent of "bargaining
with." See supra text accompanying notes 255-58.
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Work teams may not constitute labor organizations, but simply rotating
membership on employee committees seems insufficient evidence that they
do not represent employees, even assuming section 2(5) requires represen-
tativeness.2"9 Discussions of "managerial" functions are outside the sub-
jects listed in section 2(5), but this provision states that an employee com-
mittee is a labor organization as long as it deals "in part" with statutory
subjects.3 0° In any event, under this Article's proposal to expand the scope
of bargaining, subjects that currently are "managerial" would become
"conditions of work" under section 2(5).
The innovative decisions occasionally recognized that they were strain-
ing the meaning of sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) to conform to their interpre-
tation of the NLRA's general purposes. In the very process of developing
novel analyses of these provisions, courts acknowledged that literal con-
structions could not support the decisions they reached. Yet they protested
that traditional analysis, by frustrating or undermining the Act's commit-
ment to employee free choice, would be "myopic." ' 1 While urging suffi-
cient flexibility to permit "constructive" employee committees, one opinion
recognized the barriers of prior cases and asked Congress for "a helping
hand" in defining when employers could deal with such committees with-
out committing an unfair labor practice."0 2 Although these opinions did
not recognize the relationship between the literal language they minimized
and the overall structure of the NLRA, they did reflect awareness that
some of the more creative attempts to reinterpret sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2),
including their own, were implausible.
299. According to some cases, groups of employees that do not "represent" the entire workforce
fall outside the definition of a labor organization in § 2(5). "The essence of a labor organization," one
Board decision asserted, "is a group or a person which stands in an agency relationship to a larger
body on whose behalf it is called upon to act." General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1234
(1977). Otherwise, any staff meeting could be construed as the creation of a labor organization. As
long as members of any employee group speak in their individual capacities rather than as representa-
tives of other employees, the group should not be called a labor organization. Id. at 1234-35.
The Board developed this position in a case where the employer had divided the entire workforce
into teams. None of the teams, the Board held, constituted a labor organization. Id. A subsequent
circuit court decision extended this reasoning to a standing employee committee composed of only a
fraction of the employees. Influenced by the "continuous rotation" of committee membership designed
to spread participation widely throughout the workforce, the court reasoned that the members of this
committee related to management as individuals, not as representatives of their fellow workers.
Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d at 294-95.
300. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982). One decision contrasted "managerial" functions with the statu-
tory list. Examples included various aspects of job enrichment programs, such as interviewing job
applicants and setting starting and quitting times. General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. at 1235. Some
cases defined as a managerial responsibility the adjudication, as opposed to the presentation, of griev-
ances. See, e.g., Sparks Nugget, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 275, 276 (1977), modified sub nom. NLRB v.
Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1980) (modified on other grounds). See generally Mercy-
Memorial Hosp. Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1977). And committee work that occasionally shaded
into statutory areas could be construed as insufficient to transform the committee into a labor organi-
zation. General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. at 1235.
301. See, e.g., Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d at 295; Hertzka & Knowles v.
NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 1974).
302. NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 289 F.2d 177, 188 (5th Cir. 1961) (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
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D. Suggested Modifications of Company Domination in Professional
Employment
The development of a legal structure more conducive to the implemen-
tation of professional values requires changes in the concept of company
domination. Current law seems to permit standing employee committees
negotiated as part of collective bargaining agreements. The employer can-
not dominate committees when an independent union is involved with
their "formation and administration" and can refuse to agree to their con-
tinuation in a subsequent agreement..3 3 But the broad definition of "deal-
ing with" under section 2(5) and the emphasis on lack of structural auton-
omy as the key test of company domination under section 8(a)(2)
essentially preclude the existence of employee committees in other circum-
stances. Collegial committees of professional employees need the support
from employers that violates section 8(a)(2). It is unrealistic and unrea-
sonable to expect employees themselves to sustain the costs of these
organizations.
Neither employees nor employers should be precluded from choosing
collegial committee structures to encourage input from professional em-
ployees on policy issues related to their expertise. Professional employees
should be able to select traditional methods of collegial governance, despite
their lack of structural independence from the employer, as an alternative
to collective bargaining. And employers of professionals should have dis-
cretion to establish such structures as long as they do not manipulate them
to avoid unionization or prevent them from operating effectively.
Collegial governance after a union election, moreover, should not de-
pend on the agreement of either the union or a majority of the profes-
sional employees. As long as the employer adheres to the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement, it should be able to foster professionalism
by maintaining and consulting with collegial bodies, just as it should be
able to hear the views of an individual or group of professional employees.
Under my proposed expansion of the scope of bargaining, the employer
would still be required to negotiate with the union over the broadened
scope of mandatory subjects. But this requirement should not preclude
discussions on the same topics with standing committees of professional
employees.
Implementing these suggestions requires going beyond the innovative,
though legally unconvincing, analysis contained in recent interpretations
303. Kohler, supra note 27, at 547, apparently agrees that committees established as part of
worker participation programs do not violate the NLRA if management simultaneously accepts the
legitimate role of a "self-organized, autonomous employee association." Sockell, supra note 27, at 554,
convincingly argues that the NLRB and the courts would probably find an unfair labor practice if "a
union challenged an employees' committee operating outside union control." Yet she unpersuasively
seems to add, with little supporting argument, that even union backing cannot save employee commit-
tees whose functions in any way overlap with those of the union. Id.
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of sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2). For example, linking the legitimacy of em-
ployee committees to employee free choice prevents employers who believe
in formal professional involvement in organizational decision-making from
establishing such committees over the objections of employees who do not
share this fundamental professional value. And allowing employee com-
mittees and employers to confer only as long as it does not constitute deal-
ing under section 2(5) seems to preclude the more substantial relationship
that should characterize professional employment. In my view, the defini-
tion of company domination that best promotes professional values should
be limited to actual employer interference with the independent decision-
making of employee committees, whether or not this interference derives
from anti-union animus. Unless committees of professional employees are
able to reach their own conclusions, they cannot provide the employer
with the expert advice that justifies their existence.
By allowing discussions between employers and committees of profes-
sional employees about subjects of collective bargaining, my proposed
amendment to the treatment of exclusive representation in section 9(a)3"'
also suggests limitations on the reach of company domination in the pro-
fessional setting. An analogous amendment to section 8(a)(2) would com-
plement this proposed amendment to section 9(a) and would reinforce its
message in the context of company domination.
3 0 5
A looser definition of company domination, like the corresponding pro-
posed amendment to section 9(a), would still prohibit much of the objec-
tionable employer behavior precluded by the current statute. For example,
the NLRB, union activists, and scholars have all identified situations in
which employers established or revitalized faculty governance either as an
attempt to defeat the union during an organizing campaign or to avoid
bargaining with the exclusive representative after a union election. 0 6
These employers would violate my proposed amendment to section 8(a)(2)
304. See supra note 213 (text of proposed amendment).
305. The following language could function as an additional proviso to § 8(a)(2 ) and in analogous
legislation governing the public sector:
Provided, that in units composed primarily of professional employees an employer, after con-
sultation with the exclusive representative if one exists, may form and support committees of
employees or joint committees of employees and management representatives. An employer
may discuss any subject with such committees as long as the employer does not manipulate
them (1) to prevent their effective operation, (2) to avoid unionization, or (3) to violate the
duty to bargain in good faith with an exclusive union representative.
This language would legitimate and extend the creative standards of interpretation in the innovative
decisions under § 2(5) and § 8(a)(2) that cannot be justified under existing law.
306. See, e.g., Stephens Inst., 241 N.L.R.B. 454, 470 (1979) (principal stockholder and president
of proprietary art college created faculty senate to oppose efforts of teachers to organize union), en-
forced, 620 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1980); F. KRmERFR & J. BALDRIDGE, UNIONS ON CAMPUS 163-64,
210-12 (1975) (discussing claims of attempts to avoid unions at City University of New York, Central
Michigan University, and Pennsylvania State University); Yellowitz, Academic Governance and Col-
lective Bargaining in the City University of New York, 73 ACADEME 8 (Nov.-Dec. 1987) (union
officer asserts administration at City University of New York established faculty senate to prevent
union election).
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as well as the current statute. Moreover, employers' commission of inde-
pendent unfair labor practices could constitute evidence of prohibited ma-
nipulation under this amendment."' 7 And the amendment's reference to
the "effective operation"3 8 of employee or joint committees should be con-
strued to require that employers provide them with sufficient information
to fulfill their professional responsibilities. Committees of professional em-
ployees, like unions, need adequate information to function properly.309
Yet my suggested modification of company domination does create some
of the dangers the framers of sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) intended to avoid.
Of greatest concern, the substantial expansion of permissible contacts be-
tween employers and committees of professional employees would make it
easier for employers to dominate and interfere with these committees and
to subvert unions. Actual manipulation would still be forbidden, but the
potential for manipulation without detection would be dramatically in-
creased. Nonetheless, this risk is worth taking to facilitate the independent
communication of professional expertise and judgment between employees
and employers in both union and non-union contexts. The expansion I
propose in the scope of bargaining, moreover, provides at least a partial
check on the employer's power after the selection of an exclusive union
representative.
IV. CONCLUSION
Current legal rules about exclusive representation and company domi-
nation, like those distinguishing between mandatory and permissive sub-
jects of bargaining, create unfortunate barriers to the development of col-
lective bargaining compatible with the legitimate goals of professional
employees. All of these legal rules, which are derived from assumptions
about collective bargaining in the industrial sector, impede efforts by pro-
fessional employees to communicate effectively with their employers about
crucial matters of professional concern. The distinction between
mandatory and permissive subjects restricts professional influence through
unions, while exclusive representation and company domination limit the
307. A Ninth Circuit panel held that an architectural firm through various speeches during a
decertification election had threatened its professional employees in violation of § 8(a)(1). Hertzka &
Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974). Yet the panel rejected claims that the firm had
violated § 8(a)(2) by establishing joint committees of employees and partners after it won the election.
The panel did not even address whether its findings of prior employer threats should affect in any
way its evaluation of the subsequent establishment of joint committees. Id. at 629-31. Although I
advocate a broader range of employer discretion in establishing committees of professional employees
than the innovative decisions interpreting the current law, I would be reluctant to approve over union
opposition any committee formed by an employer who had recently or simultaneously demonstrated
hostility to unionization by committing unfair labor practices of any sort.
308. See supra note 305 (text of proposed amendment to § 8(a)(2)).
309. The Supreme Court has recognized an obligation to disclose relevant information to the
union as part of the employer's duty to bargain in good faith. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S.
149, 152-54 (1956). Bellace, supra note 124, at 82 would require a "right of information" as part of
her proposal regarding "mandatory consultation."
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impact of individual employees and employee committees outside the
union rubric.
Requiring employers to negotiate about subjects that are currently de-
fined as permissive would encourage the inclusion of provisions on issues
of professional concern in enforceable collective bargaining agreements.
Topics for mandatory bargaining might include collegial governance and
academic freedom in universities, guidelines for nursing practice in hospi-
tals, and codes of professional responsibility in legal services programs. At
the same time, modifications in the current principles of exclusive repre-
sentation and company domination would promote an application of labor
law to professional employment that does not preclude non-union contacts
about professional issues. Employers could consult informally with em-
ployees and implement collegial structures whether or not employees have
voted for union representation. 10
This proposal cannot guarantee a system of collective bargaining that
promotes professionalism. Unions and employers committed to following
the traditional industrial model of labor relations cannot be forced to ne-
gotiate agreements that incorporate professional values. Unions could bar-
gain for and even strike in support of provisions that favor a reactive
grievance procedure over consultative collegial bodies. Employers could
seek or agree to such provisions and refuse to take advantage of expanded
opportunities to consult with professional employees outside the union
framework. Yet this proposal at least overcomes existing legal obstacles
and better reconciles the basic right to bargain collectively with the bene-
fits of professionalism.
The recommendations of this proposal are interrelated. Neither the ab-
olition of the distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects of
bargaining nor the loosening of the principles of exclusive representation
and company domination should be attempted alone. Broadening the
scope of bargaining without loosening exclusive representation and com-
pany domination would limit excessively the ability of individuals and
committees outside the union rubric to express their professional expertise
and judgment. Loosening exclusive representation and company domina-
tion without broadening the scope of mandatory bargaining would unduly
weaken a union's ability to exercise collective strength in matters of legiti-
mate professional concern to its members. But simultaneously broadening
310. At least one decision in the public sector supports such a system. The Supreme Court of
California rejected the assertion by school districts that the public interest in education demands a
narrow definition of the scope of collective bargaining. The court pointed out that the state statute
governing teacher negotiations requires early and meaningful public disclosure of collective bargaining
proposals and opportunitites for citizens to express their views on these proposals before negotiations
between the parties begin. As a result, the court concluded, the public interest can be accommodated
even when mandatory bargaining includes major issues of policy. San Mateo City School Dist. v.
Public Employment Relations Bd., 33 Cal. 3d 850, 863-64, 191 Cal. Rptr. 800, 809, 663 P.2d 523,
532 (1983). Analogous reasoning suggests a broad scope of mandatory bargaining combined with
significant opportunities for other expressions of professional views to employers.
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the scope of mandatory bargaining while loosening exclusive representa-
tion and company domination might allow a combination of union and
non-union influence that accommodates collective bargaining and profes-
sionalism much more successfully than the current system of labor law. If
this proposal is implemented and proves successful in professional em-
ployment, its application to other employees might then be considered,
particularly given current trends away from industrial employment and
innovative departures from the traditional system of labor relations within
the industrial sector itself.
